

FORUM ARTIS RHETORICAE

Acta edita in quibus historia, ratio ususq. artis rhetoricae tractantur
Pismo poświęcone historii i teorii retoryki oraz retoryce
praktycznej

RETORYKA I RELIGIA RHETORICA ET RELIGIO

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Szanowni Państwo!

Kolejne, ósmy i dziewiąty numery naszego Pisma, to numery poświęcone jednemu tematowi: Retoryka Religii w kontekście transformacji w krajach Europy Centralnej i Wschodniej oraz w Rosji.

Religia i język religii grały ważną i zróżnicowaną rolę w politycznych transformacjach w krajach byłego bloku sowieckiego a także w samej Rosji. W każdym z tych krajów, dyskurs religijny miał inne źródła i wywodził się z innych tradycji historycznych, a także ząbębiał się w inny sposób z nowo powstającymi dyskursami demokracji, suwerenności, społeczeństwa obywatelskiego, czy też tożsamości narodowej. W każdym z tych krajów religia pozostaje też do dziś problemem, zarówno w jeśli chodzi o nie całkiem wyjaśnione zaszłości pomiędzy kościołem a państwem (czy też pomiędzy pewną częścią duchowieństwa a władzą) jak i jeśli chodzi o powiązania pomiędzy religią a polityką czy stosunki państwo-kościół w nowej, demokratycznej terażniejszości.

Artykuły zamieszczone w niniejszych numerach pisma stanowią próby podejścia do tych powiązań i problemów z perspektywy retoryki w kontekstach transformacji w Polsce, Rosji, Rumunii, i Litwie. Autorzy skupiają uwagę przede wszystkim na tym w jaki sposób dyskurs religii był używany do artykułowania, prowadzenia, bądź kontestowania zamierzeń i działań politycznych. W centrum uwagi autorów jest wiec, różnie pojęte i podjęte, zagadnienie powiązań pomiędzy religią i polityką z punktu widzenia retoryki.

Artykuły są rozszerzonymi wersjami referatów wygłoszonych w ramach panelu na XVI konferencji Międzynarodowego Towarzystwa Historii Retoryki – ISHR (pod hasłem “retoryka i religia”) która odbyła się w Strasburgu 24-28 lipca 2007 roku. Celem panelu była refleksja nad powiązaniem pomiędzy religią a polityką, jak i retoryka religii a specyfika kontekstu historycznego, na podstawie przypadków krajów postkomunistycznych, a szczególnie momentu transformacji, tak płodnego pod każdym względem dla badaczy retoryki.

W dziale *Ogłoszenia / Nuntii* podajemy program konferencji *RETORYKA I NAUKA*, 26 października 2007.

Oczekujemy na Państwa jako na autorów i propagatorów idei powrotu do retoryki – do retoryki klasycznej, do *téchne rhetoriké* Arystotelesa, wspartej Platońską ideą *kalokagathia*.

Editorial Introduction: Religious Rhetoric and the Political Transformations in Central/Eastern Europe and Russia

Religion and religious discourse played important and varying roles in the political transformations in the countries of the former Soviet block, as well as in Russia itself. In each country, religious discourse came from different sources and historical traditions; it also intersected in diverse ways with the emerging discourses of democracy, sovereignty, civil society, and national identity. In each country, religion remains somewhat of a problem, both in terms of the relationship between church and state (or some segments of the priesthood and the authorities) during the past regime and in terms of the relationship between religion and politics and church and state in the new, democratic present.

The papers presented below explore these intersections and problems in the specific contexts of the transformations in Poland, Russia, Romania, and Lithuania, focusing on how religious language has been used to articulate, pursue, and contest political agendas and action. The authors thus focus, from different angles and in different ways, on the relationships between religion and politics from a rhetorical perspective.

Originally, the papers formed a panel at the 16th conference of the International Society for the History of Rhetoric (on the theme of “rhetoric and religion”) held in Strasbourg, France, on July 24-28, 2007. The theme of the conference was “rhetoric and religion.” The aim of the panel was to interrogate the intersections between religious rhetoric and politics, as well as religious rhetoric and the specificity of the historical context, through the case studies explored in each paper. The papers have been revised and expanded to form the special section of *Forum Artis Rhetoricae*.

Cezary Ornatowski and Jakub Z. Lichanski

PS In the *Advertisements / Nuntii* section we publish the program of the 6th Rhetorical Conference *Rhetoric and Science*, October 26, 2007. We will give information about the Authors of current issue of our periodical.

We expect your collaboration as authors and promoters of the idea of the return to rhetoric: classical rhetoric, Aristotle’s *téchne rhetoriké* and Plato’s notion of *kalokagathia*.

Cezar M. ORNATOWSKI

Rhetoric, Religion, and Politics in the Talks Between the Church and the Authorities in Poland, 1980-1989.¹

Retoryka, Religia, i Polityka w Kontekście Rozmów Kościół-Władza w Polsce, 1980-1989

Streszczenie

Religia i polityka stanowią, i artykułują, dwie różne ale uzupełniające i przecinające się zasadnicze relacje: *divinitas*, relacja człowieka do elementu transcendentnego, duchowego, wewnętrznego; i *civitas*, relacje które stanowią konkretną, historycznie istniejącą społeczność. Te dwie relacje stanowią zasadnicze modalności istnienia ludzkiego w świecie. Przecinają się one w momencie etycznym, w którym transcendentne zasady lub moralne wartości przekładają się na stosunki lub działalność polityczną. Moment “przekładania” pociąga za sobą retorykę.

Gaudium et spes, konstytucja współczesnego Kościoła Katolickiego, ujmuje współzależność pomiędzy religią i polityką jako funkcje dwoistej, zarazem “osobowej” i “społecznej” natury człowieka i jego istnienia na przecięciu dwóch porządków: doczesnego i wiecznego. Definiuje ona zatem tę współzależność jako wynik historycznie skontekstualizowanej wykładni etycznej nauki Kościoła w stosunku do porządku społecznego (porządku na który składają się zarówno relacje “obywatelskie” jak i relacje władzy, pomiędzy obywatelami a władzą).

Autor śledzi te historyczne współzależności pomiędzy retoryką, religią, i polityką na przykładzie rozmów między przedstawicielami Episkopatu i władzy w latach 80ych. Rozmowy te, rozpoczęte przygotowaniem do wizyty Papieża Jana Pawła II do Polski w 1979 roku, rozwinęły się z czasem z mechanizmu do rozwiązywania bieżących problemów w strategiczne partnerstwo bez precedensu w tzw. obozie socjalistycznym. W efekcie stały się one eksperymentem we współdziałaniu który odegrał zasadniczą rolę w doprowadzeniu do rozmów “Okragłego Stolu.”

W kontekście tych rozmów, ewolucja stosunków pomiędzy religią i polityką w latach 80ych składała się, z jednej strony, ze stopniowej “kolonizacji” coraz szerszych obszarów

¹ A shorter version of this paper was presented at the 16th congress of the International Society for the History of Rhetoric, Strasbourg, France, July 24-28, 2007.

dotychczas ‘politycznej’ rzeczywistości przez aksjologiczny język i pojęciowość religijną, a z drugiej strony przez “dekolonizację” przestrzeni “osobistej” i “moralnej” przez język polityki. W Polsce dzisiejszej (2007), język religii przenika język polityki i innych dziedzin życia społecznego (np. edukacji, polityki społecznej, czy zdrowia); przed 1980 rokiem, języki te były ściśle rozdzielone, wręcz nieprzystosowalne. Można by zasugerować, że ogólne zamazanie granic pomiędzy polityką i religią w Polsce Ludowej jak i stopniowa “moralizacja” języka polityki i utrata legitymacji (i autorytetu) przez władzę polityczną w latach 80-tych doprowadziły do przesunięcia środka ciężkości układu społecznego z ułomnej wspólnoty obywatelskiej ku idealnej wspólnotie duchowo/moralnej (ucieleśnionej, dla wielu, przynajmniej w latach 1980-81, w idei “Solidarności” jako utopijnej wspólnoty duchowo/politycznej, alternatywnej wobec skompromitowanych nadziei realnego socjalizmu). To przesunięcie stanowiło być może zasadniczą, aczkolwiek niewidzialną, transformację która z kolei stała się podstawą już ściśle politycznej transformacji która nastąpiła wkrótce potem. Konsekwencje tej transformacji wciąż się rozgrywają w nowej, demokratycznej Polsce.

Introduction

In a recent overview of the problematic of rhetoric and religion, Laurent Pernot has suggested that the relationship between rhetoric and religion is to be sought in areas where “rhetoric and religion cross paths” (253). These include the “affinities that exist between persuasion and belief and between art and the sacred” (253), religious polemic and conflict, blasphemy, and “the feeling of belonging to a community” (254). By “community” Pernot understands both religious communities per se as well as “the rhetorical community formed by the audience listening to a speaker” (254).

That communities are to a significant extent constituted through discourse and symbols has become an established tenet of sociological thought (see, for instance, Anderson, Bauman, Cohen). Rhetoric may be involved in the constitution of communities in various ways beyond “the audience listening to a speaker”: it may play a role in the collective “imagining” of community (I’m referring here to the title of Benedict Anderson’s seminal work); it may have a “constitutive” function (Charland); and it may play a variety of roles in the construction and articulation of collective identities (Cohen; Llobera; Ornatowski, “Topoi”; Radcliffe and Westwood). In any of these roles, rhetoric may “cross paths” with religion.

Indeed, rhetoric and religion crossed paths repeatedly in the course of the political transition in Poland. Most significant in this respect were perhaps the visits, oratory, and writings of Pope John Paul II (for an analysis of the rhetoric of John Paul II's visits to Poland, see Ornatowski, "Spiritual Leadership"). Less visible but also important was the fundamentally Christian inspiration behind the ideology (such as it was) and discourse of "Solidarity" (for a Christian exegesis of the concept of "Solidarity," see Tischner). Other important aspects of the Polish transition where rhetoric and religion "crossed paths" include the sermons of such "political" priests as Jerzy Popieluszko, various religious ceremonies (for instance, pilgrimages to Jasna Gora), and performances and exhibitions in churches during the 1980s. In all of these cases, rhetoric, religion, and politics participated in various ways in the constitution, or rather reconstitution, of the Polish civic/political community (or, to use Kenneth Burke's suggestive term, "congregation") (Burke, "Attitudes").

In the present reflection, I examine the relationship between rhetoric, religion, and politics in the context of the talks between the Polish Church and the authorities during the 1980s. These talks, started initially to prepare the 1979 visit of Pope John Paul II, turned, after 1982, into regular contacts that encompassed an increasingly broad spectrum of social, political, and economic issues: labor and criminal law, international relations, the American embargo on the import of corn to feed chickens, and many others. Through much of the 1980s, these talks were conducted through three major avenues: the "Joint" Commission that focused on the visits of Pope John Paul II; the "Mixed" Commission that dealt with the relations between church and state and the Vatican and Poland; and individual contacts between selected bishops and selected regime officials that dealt with all manner of issues, including ones that could not be resolved within the two commissions. By 1987, these talks evolved from a mechanism for addressing and resolving specific problems to a strategic partnership unprecedented in the Eastern block, in effect an experiment in shared decision-making that played a critical role in the political breakthrough of 1989 (Ornatowski, "Spiritual Leadership"; Orszulik; Raina, "Wizyty," "Cele"; *Tajne Dokumenty*).²

² The fact of continuous talks, however, does not mean that the struggle between the Church and the state diminished in intensity. The talks, at least until the mid-1980s, took place against the background of intense official offensive against the Church. This offensive took such forms as, to mention just a few, intensified attempts to recruit priests as informers of the security forces; intensified surveillance of the Church at all levels; attempts to create or intensify internal conflicts within the Church; or attempts to calculate the value of Church possessions or of the building material contained in Churches and other real property to use in

The relationship between what Franklin Littell has referred to as the “two covenants”--the religious and the political--is an important aspect of the constitution of nations and other communities. To a significant extent, this relationship determines the character of the community. In Poland, this relationship changed dramatically between the late 1970s and early 1990s (this change was reflected, among other things, in the changing public responses of Pope John Paul II’s visits; see Ornatowski, “Spiritual Leadership”). Understanding these changes may facilitate an informed dialog about the role of religion in Polish political life today.

This discussion will begin with some preliminary general reflections on the relationship between rhetoric, religion, and politics. Then, I briefly discuss this relationship, for comparative purposes, in the American tradition. Finally, I attempt to trace, in a preliminary way, the evolution of this relationship in Poland from the late 1970s through the end of the 1980s, focusing on what we can learn about it from the Church-government talks between 1981 and 1989.

Rhetoric, Religion, and Politics: Some Conceptual Background

A recent issue of *Newsweek* magazine devoted to the global resurgence of religious fervor, noted that “[f]aith may or may not move mountains, but it is doubtless one of the prime movers in politics” (Prothero). In spite of modern talk about the “separation of church and state,” within Christianity at least, religion and politics have always been intimately related. In the prophetic tradition, as in Christian witness more generally, religion *is* politics. As Charles Davis points out, “Yahweh from the beginning was a political God. Most of the images and symbols we use of god are [both] social and political in their basic meaning. . . . Jesus died, not because of his inner life of prayer, but because of his impact upon the social order” (59).

One of the factors that underlie the essentially performative character of Christian faith is that the faithful find themselves in always changing situations and circumstances (Fodor and Hauerwas). This performative character is expressed, among other things, in the

propaganda that showed how “rich” the Church was in a “suffering” country and how many apartments for people could have been built with the materials used for the building of Churches and other Church properties (see “Tajne Instrukcje do Walki z Kosciolem,” in Orszulik,46-50).

fundamentally rhetorical nature of Christian theology, which, according to James Fodor and Stanley Hauerwas, consists of “the performing of a rhetoric,” a constant attempt to find the right words to express the Christian sense of the world as it happens to be at a given juncture. Old Testament prophets spoke or acted in, as well as in relation and response to, historic circumstances; what all Old Testament prophets had in common is that “their ministries were undertaken at critical moments in the political and religious history of their people” (Mowley 18). The core of prophetic rhetoric is its focus on the moral foundations of collective life; in the words of Abraham Heschel, “[a]bove all, the prophets remind [their audience] of the moral state of a people” (16). Nancey Murphy suggests that moral judgment or moral discernment “has traditionally been a function of the Christian community under the guidance of the Holy Spirit.” (124). According to Davis, “[r]eligion has historically played both socially integrative and revolutionary roles in society” (37). These dual roles are due to the inherent ambiguity of religious language. Religious faith, Davis suggests, “by pushing us toward the Transcendent, relativizes every existing [social and political] order. In so far as any existing social order absolutizes itself, religious faith becomes subversive and revolutionary in the usual political sense” (37).

One might suggest that religion and politics constitute, and articulate, two different, yet ultimately complementary and intersecting relationships: *divinitas*, the relationship to the transcendent (or at least to some “transcendent” moral principle, such as “equality” or “social justice”); and *civitas*, the relations that constitute people into a specific, historically existing community. These two types of relations constitute the complementary modalities of the human being in the world. They intersect in the ethical moment, in which “transcendent” principles or moral values are rendered in terms of “political” relations and action. It is this moment of “rendering” that involves rhetoric.

Such a relationship between rhetoric, religion, and politics is implicit in Aristotle. Rhetoric, Aristotle suggests, “is a kind of offshoot, on the one hand, of Dialectic, and, on the other, of that study of Ethics which may be properly called ‘political’” since it concerns conduct *in relation to groups* and the conduct of groups (1.2, p.9, emphasis added). In this sense, ethics is both a component of rhetoric as well as of politics. Furthermore, the presence of “moral purpose” is essential to both rhetoric as an art and to a rhetorician qua rhetorician (as opposed to a “mere” sophist). If one assumes that an ethical component, and especially the sense of a moral purpose underlying both human actions and the larger design of the world, is

also central to religion, one may suggest that it is thus in “practical” ethics (ethical precepts, beliefs, or values as expressed through collective relations or conduct)--and particularly in “moral purpose”--that rhetoric, politics, and religion intersect.³ Politics without ethics becomes at best “social engineering” and at worst cynical manipulation, just as rhetoric without ethics in the context of politics becomes mere propaganda. Pope John Paul II’s appears to have had something like this in mind when he uttered the famous words in his speech in the Polish parliament during the historic 1999 visit: “History teaches us that democracy without values easily metamorphoses into open or concealed totalitarianism” (*Jan Pawel II*, 1085).

Some such relationship between religion and politics appears to be articulated in *Gaudium et Spes* (Joy and Hope), the pastoral constitution for the modern Church promulgated by Pope Paul VI on December 7, 1965:

The Church and the political community in their own fields are autonomous and independent from each other. Yet both, under different titles, are devoted to the *personal and social vocation of the same men*. The more that both foster sounder *cooperation between themselves with due consideration for the circumstances of time and place*, the more effective will their service be exercised for the good of all. For man's horizons are not limited only to the temporal order; while living in the context of human history, he preserves intact his eternal vocation. The Church, for her part, founded on the love of the Redeemer, contributes toward the reign of justice and charity within the borders of a nation and between nations. By preaching the truths of the Gospel, and bringing to bear on all fields of human endeavor the light of her doctrine and of a Christian witness, she respects and fosters the *political freedom and responsibility of citizens*.⁴ (emphasis added)

The passage conceives the relationship between religion and politics as a function of the dual, at once “personal” and “social,” nature of man and of his existence at the intersection of the temporal and eternal orders. It defines the specific terms of this relationship as an outcome of a historically contextualized, and thus contingent (“with due consideration to the

³ Here, one may recall Burke’s dictum that “action” (as opposed to motion) always implies ethics (*Rhetoric of Religion*, 41).

⁴ **Błąd! Nie można odnaleźć źródła odwołania.**, accessed June 20, 2007.

circumstances of time and place”), application of the Church’s ethical teaching to the civic realm (the realm that involves relations of “citizenship,” those among citizens as well as among citizens and political authority).

Rhetoric, Religion, and Politics in the United States

As implied in *Gaudium et Spes*, the precise character of the relationship between religion and politics has been historically variable. The end of the Constantinian era brought an end to the relatively unified (at least in theory, if not necessarily in political practice) political-cultural-religious formation known as Christendom. Over the last century in Western Europe, and longer in the United States, the two covenants--the religious and the political--have become (at least temporarily and in certain respects) separated. The reasons for this in Western Europe, include, besides post-Enlightenment rationalism and the rise of “political science,” also disillusionment with the inability of religion to resist the depredations of intolerance, nationalism, and ethnic hatred (most notably in the case of the Holocaust), often under a religious cover (Friedenberg). In America, the formal separation between religion and politics has been ascribed to a number of factors, among them a desire on the part of the founders to avoid the kind of religious persecution they experienced in the establishmentarian European states and the existence of a variety of religious denominations in the new American republic.⁵ Whatever the reasons, by the end of the 19th century the political orator rather than the preacher effectively dominated debate on public issues in the United States (Heimert).

Roderick P. Hart has described the relations between religion and politics in the United States in terms of the metaphor of “contract.” This “contract,” according to Hart, comprises four major implicit assumptions or “agreements”: that “the guise of complete separation” between the government and religion “will be maintained by both parties”; that “the guise of existential equality” between the government and religion will be maintained by both parties, but the religious realm shall be solely that of the rhetorical”; that political rhetoric will “refrain from being overtly religious” and religious rhetoric from being “overtly political”; and that neither political nor religious leaders will “in any fashion whatsoever,

⁵ See Hart and Pauley for a quick review of the various explanations for the Church-state relationship in the U.S.

make known to the general populace the exact terms” of this contract (Hart and Pauley 44). The public controversy that surrounds occasional lapses from these terms either by religious or political leaders, may be taken as a sign of the implicit public expectation of the continuation of this contract, even though it remains largely below public awareness. This “contract” implicitly defines the relative roles of religion and government in public life and forms the foundation of “civic piety”: public manifestations of religious sentiment that are a part of the American political scene.

Robert Bellah has famously (and controversially) characterized such manifestations as the “American civil religion.” This “religion” consists in “certain common elements of religious orientation that the great majority of Americans share” and that are “expressed in a set of [professed] beliefs, symbols, and rituals” in the political sphere, including religious references in political speeches, religious accents in state ceremonies, religious elements on public edifices, White House Prayer Breakfasts, and so on (3-4). This “civil religious” dimension of public life provides, according to Bellah, transcendent legitimation for political authority, a transcendent grounding for civil rights, and a transcendent goal for the political process (expressed most vividly, in the American political tradition, in the notion of “manifest destiny”).

Robert Friedenberg has suggested that American political leaders do not have much of a choice but to observe the terms of Hart’s “contract” between religion and politics, given the current political, religious, and cultural specificity of the American context. To engage in “overtly religious” rhetoric they would have to use “faith-specific” rhetoric, which, Friedenberg notes, would be difficult in an increasingly religiously diverse country such as the United States. On the other hand, the rhetoric of religious leaders would have to be “policy and candidate specific” to be thought of as “overtly political” (122). American civil-religious rhetoric is thus generally devoid of specific content of practical policy, dealing rather in general symbols and images; it lacks, as Hart put it, a “truly prophetic God” (Hart and Pauley 72). Its “rhetorical energy” derives rather from its “capacity to ennoble ideas” and to be supportive of national myths that “allow average Americans to transcend the banalities of day-to-day life” (Hart and Pauley 83).

The role of religion, as well as the relationship between religion and politics, in the Polish tradition and context have been, in most of these respects, quite different. While the role of the Church in Polish history has “never been solely religious” (as one of the bishops pointedly noted in a conversation with a government official during the Church-government talks of the 1980s⁶), the relationship between religion and politics in Poland became even more complex during the decade of transition. The visits of Pope John Paul II to Poland between 1979 and 1987 (and, arguably, the 1991 visit) were truly prophetic both in spirit and in their historic impact (Ornatowski, “Spiritual Leadership”). During much of the 1980s, the authority of Polish Church (unlike perhaps anywhere else in the Western world in recent times), while different in kind, was in effect greater than that of political “authorities.” Since Poland is 95 percent Roman Catholic⁷ and much less culturally and religiously diverse than the U.S., the potential choices for Polish political and religious leaders are almost the reverse of those in the U.S.: religious references by Polish politicians are almost by definition faith-specific, thus automatically becoming “overtly religious” by American political standards. At the same time, due to the Church’s involvement in the political transition, religious rhetoric inevitably became “overtly political” by American standards, both in being as it were forced to deal with fundamentally political issues and in having to address specific policies, proposals, and arrangements directly. The effects persist on the Polish public scene, with the relative roles of the Church and secular authority, and the discourses of religion and politics, in a complicated and tense relationship.

Rhetoric, Religion, and Politics in Real-Socialist Poland

In periods of political stability, the relationship between religion and politics stabilizes, whether in a relationship of mutual legitimation (as in the United States and Western Europe today) or mutual antagonism (as during much of the period of real socialism in Poland). In the mid-1970s, Hart described the relationship between religion and civic authority in the United States in the following terms:

⁶ Orszulik 303.

⁷ The other major denominations include Orthodox (1,5 percent) and Protestant, mainly Evangelical (1 percent). (Data from portal Poland.pl http://www.poland.pl/info/information_about_poland/society.htm, August 10, 2007)

“[O]rganized religion sets a certain ‘tone’ in the U.S., a respect for faithfulness, and a commitment to higher values. Government is an unimaginative, spiritless oaf in contrast. Government builds roads, outfits people for battle, regulates the country’s shipping, subsidizes its farms, computerizes its tax forms. Religion, in contrast, posits transcendent verities, takes a stand on other-worldly issues, discourses about the intangible, points citizens toward over-arching ethical standards, and retrieves them from the miasma of ordinary existence. In short, religion gives people faith in faith.”
(Hart and Pauley 50)

Hart’s description (which he confirmed in a 2005 reissue of the book) conveys a fundamental complementarity (in spite of occasional conflicts over specific issues) of spiritual and civic dimensions of collective life, articulated in the respective functions of religious and political authority--a complementarity confirmed through manifestations of civil piety expressed in the “civil religion.” The contrast to the situation in real-socialist Poland could not be greater.

In the decades preceding the 1980s, the relationship between politics and religion in Poland might best be described as having moved from a “hot” war to a “cold” war. The period of open war on religion came to a close with the end of the Stalinist era; the Church had turned out to be too powerful to be annihilated or rendered irrelevant. Yet, any “religious dimension” was absent from the political realm. Neither the Church nor the authorities could effectively interfere in the sphere proper to the other, although both tried. Both the Church and the real socialist regime refrained from publicly acknowledging the legitimacy of the other party; at the same time, both shied away from direct ideological confrontation (*Tajne dokumenty*; Orszulik; Rajna, *Cele*).

Unlike in Western Europe and the U.S., in real socialist Poland the state was seen as fundamentally alien in terms of the basic premises underlying the Catholic religious persuasion. (The term “persuasion” is more rhetorically productive here than “conviction” or “belief,” since, rhetorically, religious belief may be seen in terms of persuasion as well as self-persuasion; in addition, religious “beliefs” may serve as convenient cover, or argument, for fundamentally political commitments, and vice versa.) Marxist-Leninist ideology considered religion as opposed in principle to the materialist and strictly rationalist philosophy of the socialist state. For the authorities, religion represented the “opiate of the

people,” a recalcitrant remnant of the old order, in basic contradiction to the ideology of social liberation through a revolutionary movement of the proletariat. For the Church, religion constituted a fundamental and inalienable dimension of the human experience, as well as a matter of individual conscience. Hence, attempts by the authorities to discourage church attendance, drive religious instruction from the schools, or limit church construction were treated as violations of the “freedom of conscience” and thus of a basic “human right.”

Its fundamentally “ethical” focus and mass following, in the context of a totalitarian (some might perhaps prefer to say “authoritarian”) state, infused religion with “political” character. Moreover, the sphere associated with religion and the Church (including Church-sponsored activities, associations, publications, and physical spaces) provided the only remaining public, in effect civil, space beyond the control of the state. For many people “politics,” rather than religion as such, was the actual reason to go to church, participate in religious ceremonies or events, or otherwise manifest “religious” affiliation. Such blurring of boundaries between the “religious,” the “political,” and the “civic” was characteristic of the period of real socialism in Poland.

This blurring of boundaries also had another aspect. The language of real socialism, qua language, was symbolic and “negative” (as is the language of religion) in Burke’s sense of being a “translation of the *extra-symbolic* into *symbols*,” which, Burke argues, is always a “translation of something into terms of what it is not” (*Rhetoric of Religion* 22). As a specific symbolic system, the language of Marxism in its calcified, post-Stalinist Eastern European variety represented a set of internally consistent semantic operations and “linguistic maneuvers” (Burke’s term, *Rhetoric of Religion*) manifested, in rhetorical practice, through highly formalized and ritualized verbal formulas (Glowinski) and universally applicable “terministic screens” (Burke, *Language*, 28, 44-62). In those terms, the relationship between religion and politics was one of confrontation, on the specific terrain of Polish history and under concrete historical circumstances, of two “theologies”: a transcendental moral vocabulary of the “universal” Church based on the eschatology of eternal salvation, against a “strong,” self-contained interpretive system based on an eschatological utopian vision with pretensions (in spite of its avowed historicism) to ahistorical universality. These two “theologies” competed for the consciences (or, as a confidential party memorandum once put it--with characteristic omission of any “spiritual” terminology--for the “hearts and minds”) of the Polish people.

The relationship between religion and politics in Poland in the late 1970s may thus be said to have been characterized by a general blurring of boundaries, a “politicization” of “religious” attitudes and actions, a convergence of “private” and “public” through a politicization of the very notion of “conscience,” a politicization of religious space, and a “theologization” of public discourse (not in the sense of making this discourse religious, but in the sense of attempting to provide an alternative “transcendent” political “faith”).

Rhetoric, Religion, and Politics in the Negotiations Between the Church and the Authorities, 1981-1989

The imposition of martial law on Dec. 13, 1981 brought further changes in this relationship. The violent suppression of “Solidarity” and of the hopes associated with it destroyed whatever credibility the authorities had in the wake of the Gdansk Accords of August 1980. The deepening political and economic crisis that followed led to attempts by the authorities to regain “social trust” (Pol. *zaufanie społeczne*) and to “activate” the people (Pol. *aktywizacja społeczeństwa*). That is where the authorities (or at least the Jaruzelski faction, since the party was divided on how to address the situation in the country) realized they needed the Church. As the only major “independent” social institution (that is, independent of the party’s control), the Church possessed a capital of public credibility, and it was this credibility that made the Church a desirable partner in addressing the country’s problems.

The initial articulation of the mission of the Church in Poland in the new circumstances was provided by Pope John Paul II in a letter to General Jaruzelski written five days after the imposition of martial law. In this letter, the Pope appealed to Jaruzelski’s “conscience” to “stop the actions that bring with them the spilling of Polish blood” and contextualized the events of December 13 in the “last two hundred years” of Polish history, during which “much Polish blood was spilled in attempts to dominate our homeland,” specifically mentioning “the last war and occupation that brought the loss of about six million Poles who fought for their own sovereign homeland.” This contextualization conveyed a specific evaluation of the events of Dec. 13. This evaluation was at odds with the official justifications for martial law, which saw it as, one, necessary for the reestablishment of “social peace” in the face of presumed social and economic “chaos” brought about by the “Solidarity” movement and, two, as necessary to preserving Poland’s sovereignty

(presumably in the face of an imminent Soviet intervention). Most importantly, the Pope called for “dialog” between the authorities and the people for the “good of the people,” and positioned the Church as a “spokesman” for the “general human desire for peace.” This “desire,” John Paul II proposed, “suggests that the state of ‘martial law’ in Poland not be continued” (quoted in Orszulik 13-14). The ambiguous syntax of the text⁸ made the Church the spokesman for both this “general human desire for peace” (thus grounding its mission as spokesman in properly “religious” general moral terms and concerns) and for the specifically political proposition that martial law not be continued. The latter represents what Friedenbergr would call a “policy-specific” articulation, thus, by contemporary American standards of public discourse, already an impermissible “political” intervention on the part of “religion.”

In rhetorical terms, the letter shows the Pope negotiating the boundary between universal values (“peace” with all of its spiritual, political, and psychological connotations) and the immediate “political” demands of the historical context. In *The Rhetoric of Religion*, Kenneth Burke locates his “logological” investigations in the analogy between “words” and “The Word,” in what he calls the realm of “transformations” between the secular and “theological” meanings and deployments of terms (8). The Pope’s deployment of the term “peace” is located precisely at the intersection of the theological/spiritual and secular/political meanings. In the immediate context of martial law, the latter implied, and in effect demanded, a cessation of violence (an implication made “present”⁹ for the audience by the tanks and soldiers in the streets) and restoration of social harmony and order. At the deepest semantic level, the plea for the restoration of harmony and order may be read as implying a restoration of “normalcy.” The reference to the “general” human desire for “peace” contextualizes the Polish situation as at once “abnormal” (contrary to “general” standards) and yet as capable of being judged by standards that transcend specific ideological and geopolitical conditions. Such a “universalizing” move (with the implication that the entire period of real socialism was highly “abnormal”) was characteristic of John Paul II’s rhetoric in Poland between 1979 and 1987 (see, Ornatowski, “Spiritual Leadership”).

⁸ John Paul II wrote: “The general human desire for peace suggests that the state of ‘martial law’ in Poland not be continued. The Church is the spokesman for this desire” (quoted in Orszulik 14).

⁹ I’m using “presence” here the rhetorical sense suggested by Perelman.

Other major terms deployed by the Church that functioned “logologically” (that is, at the intersection between the “theological” and the secular/political) include “conscience,” “hope,” “motivation,” “conditions of life and work,” “values,” “suffering,” “respect,” “human rights,” “sovereignty,” and “dignity.” Burke argues that the “logological” perspective reveals the full scope of “language as motive” (10). Although my argument here is not concerned with logology as such, the presence of such “transformations” in the major terms deployed by the Church reveals the specific workings of religious language as “motive” in the talks between the Church and the authorities (in the “dramatistic” spirit, I’m using the term “motive” as an adverb rather than a noun).

The differences in the “motive” force of words as used by the Church and the authorities may be seen in the different interpretations and deployments of the word “dignity.” The Church interpreted “dignity” as a transcendent quality inherent in the human individual, of which the individual in a totalitarian system was deprived as it were by definition by virtue of being an object rather than agent of action. This was a fundamentally ethical and Christian interpretation, and one that infused the ethical core of the ideology, such as it was, of “Solidarity.” As used by the Church, “dignity” was thus a fundamentally axiological quality that pertained not only to individuals but extended to the foundations of the civic order. Its “motive” force in the discourse of the bishops was to question the quality of the human relations underlying the civic order. The authorities, on the other hand, were very sensitive about “dignity” as a function of appearance and perception; thus, for instance, they objected to the Church-sponsored initiative of soliciting international aid on the grounds that such solicitation amounted to “begging” and thus was detrimental to “national dignity” (an interpretation focused on self-interest rather than ethics). As used by the authorities, “dignity” was an artifact of politics understood as manipulation of perceptions, thus of propaganda.

It is important to emphasize again that both sides avoided direct ideological confrontation (Orszulik), which would have ruined the very possibility of dialog. In the face of fundamental ideological differences between the partners, after an initial period of mutual uncertainty and “feeling” each other out, a set of general propositions (or premises) emerged that allowed both sides to negotiate specific issues while keeping the dialog “containable.”

Aristotle suggests that, within general *topoi*, “the speaker, whether deliberative, forensic, or epideictic, must be supplied with propositions” regarding such things as “the possible and impossible,” “whether a thing has or has not occurred, is or is not to occur,” or “the greater and the less,” for instance “in arguing which is the greater or the lesser good, a greater or lesser act of injustice,” and so on (1.3, 1359a). Such propositions are more specific than *topoi*; rather than providing, as *topoi* do, potential general frameworks for arguments (as, for instance, in the *topos* of “more or less”), they circumscribe argumentative possibilities while still leaving a space for interpretation, contention, and deliberation.

One such proposition, or premise, was that “no Polish blood should be spilled.” This premise served the authorities as the general rationalization for having imposed martial law in the first place (otherwise, the official syllogism went, the Russians would have invaded, Poles would have resisted, and Polish blood would have been spilled), as well as for many of its provisions (for instance, by keeping people from engaging in “subversive activity,” provisions such as the prohibition on public gatherings prevented the spilling of Polish blood in street clashes and other potential disturbances). The Church, on the other hand, used the premise that “no Polish blood should be spilled” to argue against the more drastic provisions of martial law (such as the death penalty for those accused of armed subversion). The premise that “no Polish blood should be spilled” thus provided a space for deliberation on and negotiation of a variety of issues, as well as potential rationalizations for different actions and proposals (thus for “saving face”), while giving both sides the assurance that the discussion was containable within certain general limits (for instance, that nobody would advocate armed resistance, which might lead to civil war and Soviet intervention, thus to the “spilling of Polish blood”). Such assurance, in turn, provided a measure of trust between participants and allowed for a degree of candor in the talks (within the mutual realization that a high-stakes game between fundamentally implacable opponents was being played).¹⁰

¹⁰ In this connection, it is interesting to note that pronouncements addressed specifically and non-publicly to party members, and especially to the inner circle, articulated matters quite differently, demonstrating a degree of cynical removal, or perhaps simply of “faith-specificity,” in being couched in dogmatic ideological terms, quite different from the articulations during the confidential talk with the Church.

Other major propositions (or premises), of this kind that emerged during the talks included “the good of the nation is paramount,” “economic and political reform is necessary”; “the crisis must be addressed through political (as opposed to military) means”; “state security and sovereignty must be ensured”; “the ‘constitutional order’ and ‘alliances’ (the geopolitical order, specifically the alliance with the Soviet Union) must not be questioned”; and “there is a need for a new ‘social compact’” (Pol. porozumienie społeczne). Some of these premises functioned as both “boundary conditions” on and preconditions for the dialog. For instance, the regime side insisted on the premise that “the constitutional order will not be questioned” (the Church opposed the term “socialism” instead of “constitutional order”) as a precondition for engaging in any talks at all; other potential partners could join in only after accepting this premise. On the other hand, the Church posed the premises concerning “no spilling of Polish blood” and “addressing the crisis only through political means” as preconditions for its participation. Both of these premises originated in John Paul II’s initial letter to General Jaruzelski.

It is worth noticing again that the premises insisted on by the Church (such as “no spilling of Polish blood,” initiated in the Pope’s letter) appear to have been axiological in their basic character with “secondary” political implications, while the premises insisted on by the authorities (such as the need to refrain from questioning the “constitutional order” or “alliances”) were primarily political. A similar tendency characterized the way the Church posed problems and strategized its moves. For instance, in a discussion of the Church’s proposal to legalize faith-based associations, one of the bishops asked a dissenting official whether rulers have the right to forbid organizations that do not threaten the established socio-political system but through which people wish to express their concern about their country in ways other than those approved by the ruling party? (Orszulik 257). The question is general, “philosophical” and ethical in character, and concerns the ethics and limits of government; it is the kind of question that could never arise, or be posed, publicly in real socialist Poland. Another example is provided by “Communiqué 214” of the Conference of the Polish Episcopate, in which the bishops called on the authorities to seek a permanent solution to the problem of political prisoners and to seek social and legal solutions to the problems facing the country that would enable citizens to take part in public life independently of political parties (which meant, practically, outside of the ruling party and its “allies”). Since the Conference of the Episcopate was a legal institution, the authorities had to admit that its communiqué did not violate the law, even though it articulated a sentiment that went against accepted political

thinking and accepted ways of talking about politics (Orszulik 257). To the objection that the existing “legal order” must always be respected, the bishops replied that if that were indeed the general principle than no revolution, including the Russian October Revolution, would ever be possible; “the law,” one of the bishops suggested, “must consider social reality” (Orszulik 258).

Hart has suggested that what he calls “religiously-political rhetoric” “reduces inordinately complex issues to their most basic, patently religious, understructures” (46). While Hart’s description captures the basic character of the Church’s rhetorical strategy, it makes religious rhetoric sound as if it merely “reduced” political issues to “religious” formulas, and thus fails to adequately convey its potential for rhetorical and historical agency. Through the strategies described above, the Polish bishops succeeded in gradually broadening what Robert Oliver once referred to as the “realm of the discussable,” pushing the conjunction between religion and politics from the problematic of individual “freedom of conscience” to that of the limits of law, the nature of legitimate civil disobedience, the ethics of governance, the legitimacy of political authority, and, by early 1989, the very “nature of the state” (Orszulik 459), all the while keeping the Church’s credibility intact and maintaining the delicate balance between pragmatism and principle required to keep the talks moving forward.

The authorities countered such “politicization” of religion by making religion a “private” matter, thus departing from one of their major ideological tenets. In the wake of the watershed Xth Plenum of the party (December 1988), religion was declared the “personal business” of party members; “The party’s task,” as a party official put it in conversation with the bishops, would no longer be “the atheization of society” (quoted in Orszulik 458). In May 1989, parliament enacted legislation guaranteeing “freedom of conscience,” including freedom of religion.

One might suggest that, at least from the context of the Church-authorities talks, that the changes in the relationship between religion and politics over the 1980s consisted of, on the one hand, an increasing “colonization” of heretofore fundamentally civic relations (political authority, civic order, nature of the state) by the axiological discourse of religion, and, on the other hand, a gradual “decolonization” of “personal” and “moral” territory by the discourse of politics. My argument is not, of course, that “political” matters or civic relations do not or should also have “moral” character; as a rhetorician, I am interested in tracing the

shifts in the idiom in which these matters are articulated. In Poland today (2007), the idiom of religion is very much part of the public language of politics and permeates other areas of civic life (for instance, education or public health); before the 1980s, the languages of religion and politics were sharply separated, in fact, were generally considered incompatible.

One important aspect of this process of “moralization” of the civic and political realm was the shift in the nature of the relationship between the citizen and political authority. In the United States and Western Europe, one of the functions of religion (in the form of civic piety or “civil religion”) is to confer legitimacy on political authority, thus also on the civic order. In real-socialist Poland, this legitimacy was withdrawn (one of the signs of this withdrawal was lack of official diplomatic relations—of a Concordat--between socialist Poland and the Vatican). Also symbolic of this withdrawal was the choice of the figure of St. Stanislaw¹¹ by Pope John Paul II as the slogan for his first visit to Poland in 1979—a choice that was vigorously disputed by the authorities.¹² The citizens, especially religious ones, thus found themselves, theoretically at least, in a situation of divided loyalties: to spiritual authority on the one hand and civic authority on the other. During the 1980s, as civic authority carried less and less moral “authority” in the wake of the imposition of martial law and loss of credibility, this division of loyalties increasingly became a political issue. The Church lent its credibility, and thus legitimacy, to the process of “national dialog,” but at a price: the price was, in effect, political authority.

The emblematic case here is that of the eleven leaders of “Solidarity” imprisoned after the imposition of martial law who remained in prison after amnesty freed lesser “fry.” The authorities were anxious, for the sake of “national reconciliation” and domestic and international propaganda, to put the issue of political prisoners behind them. Putting the “eleven” on trial would highlight the “problem of political prisoners” in the eyes of public opinion and further exacerbate the situation in the country; on the other hand, releasing them unconditionally would simply return them into leadership roles “underground.” The solution, negotiated in 1984 between the authorities and the Church, was to have the prisoners personally foreswear political activity for a given period of time to the Primate of Poland, upon which they would be released.

¹¹ Symbolic, in Polish history, of the conflict between religion and secular authority.

¹² For an analysis of the Pope’s choice and of the dispute, see Ornatowski, “Spiritual Leadership.”

For this unusual “deal” to work, the negotiators established a set of interrelated and interdependent relationships of good faith (since the attendant obligations were not enforceable by any existing legislation or civic covenant): a “political” relationship between the Primate of Poland and the authorities, on the basis of which the authorities would free the prisoners following a public appeal from the Primate, and a “purely moral relationship” (Orszulik 123) between the prisoners and the Primate, on the basis of which the latter would use his authority (and potentially put it at risk) to appeal to the authorities to free the prisoners after the latter had made their declaration. By not making the pledge to the authorities, the prisoners remained, in terms of their own political struggle, undefeated and untainted--still credible as representatives of the people. The “purely moral relationship” of the prisoners to the Primate, thus to spiritual and moral authority, in effect replaced their allegiance to political authority, severed by the latter’s violation (through the violence of martial law) of the “social contract.”

I do not wish to overstate my case, especially on limited evidence, but one might suggest that the general blurring of the boundaries between religion and politics, the gradual “moralizing” of the language of politics, and the loss of legitimacy (and thus authority) by political authorities led to a shift in the locus of the social bond from a deficient civic community to an ideal spiritual/moral community (embodied for many people, at least between 1980 and 1981, in the general idea of “Solidarity” as a spiritual/political community alternative to the failed political promise of real socialism). The case of the “eleven” provides a symptomatic example of this shift, of an explicit, overt, and in effect legitimated—by the exigent needs of the political moment—replacement of political allegiance (however tenuous) by spiritual/moral allegiance (with explicitly political consequences). Compare the ubiquitous Gierek-era slogan which proclaimed the “political-moral unity of the nation” (Pol. *jednosc polityczno-moralna narodu*). While the emphasis in the slogan was on the “political,” with the “moral” aspect representing a specific, politicized “socialist morality” (Pol. *moralnosc socjalistyczna*), during the 1980s the center of gravity had decidedly shifted to the “moral,” with the “political” as its increasingly questionable, uncertain, and open aspect. This shift constituted a fundamental, although largely invisible, transformation that formed the run-up to and the background of the properly “political” transformation that followed. The consequences of this fundamental shift in the character of the social bond continue to play themselves out in, and haunt, the new democratic republic.

Conclusion: Toward New Dialog Between Religion and Politics

Increasingly, the global context appears to be permeated by the political deployments of religious discourse, by what appears to be a new convergence of religion and politics. This development warrants new attention to the relationship between religion, politics, and rhetoric.

My aim in these preliminary reflections was to examine the relationship between rhetoric, religion, and politics at a “revolutionary” moment in recent Polish history, to reflect on the “political” work of religion and religious discourse in the course of the reconstitution of the Polish “community.”

The relationship between religion and politics is always historical, changing and unstable. The essence of “religion” is the moral imperative that, typically, has a transcendent foundation. This moral imperative takes different political forms and is articulated in different terms in various historical contexts. In periods of political stability, many of these become “sedimented” (I’m adapting the term from Husserl, via Ernesto Laclau)¹³ in the routine “beliefs,” standard practices, and rhetoric of the community, including official “political” rhetoric.

What was interesting about the situation in Poland in the 1980s is that, for a historical moment, a beleaguered political regime, one ostensibly non-religious, even anti-religious, was in dialog—in effect in historic partnership—with the Catholic Church to attempt to solve social and economic problems. Surely, no Western Church in recent times, even in a cultural/political climate where official references to God abound, in effect played such a direct and profoundly consequential political role. Hart cites an anecdote in which “a British prime minister” presumably once said: “politics is for getting things done; if you want

¹³ By “sedimentation,” Laclau designates, borrowing the term from Edmund Husserl, the sense of “objective” givenness of social reality that results from a forgetting of origins, of the manner in which social reality was constituted.

¹³ Laclau suggests that to reveal the moment of constitution of social reality is “to reveal the moment of its radical contingency—in other words, to reinsert it in the system of real historic options that were discarded . . . by showing the terrain of the original violence, of the power relations through which that instituting act took place” (34). Thus, Laclau suggests, “[t]o understand something historically is to refer it back to its contingent conditions of emergence” (36).

transcendence go see your archbishop” (“God, Country, and a World of Words” 185). During the 1980s, Polish politicians, at least a leading faction of them, indeed headed—albeit perhaps not very willingly or in completely good faith--to the archbishop.

Such explicitly political role of the Church was not uncontroversial. Jan Rulewski is cited as opposing the “deal” in the case of the eleven “Solidarity prisoners on the grounds that the Church was playing a dangerous game (Orszulik 154). The potential consequences of the historically unique “arrangement between the cassock and the uniform,” as Rulewski referred to it, still remain to be examined (quoted in Orszulik 154).

Post-communist democracies such as Poland have only recently entered the age of dialogue regarding matters of religion and politics (even today it is difficult to talk about these matters with any distance). For this dialog to begin in earnest, it is necessary to examine and better understand the historic relationship between religion and politics. In the Polish context, this relationship includes the formal relationship between church and state, the rhetoric and activity of Pope John Paul II, the activities and rhetoric of other religious figures (i.e. Father Jerzy Popieluszko), the contacts (both formal and informal) between political authorities and religious authorities, the activities and involvements (both political and religious) of the laity, and the more general and changing affiliations of the population—not to mention the nature of the social contract that underpins the political/civic community.

In the wake of the fall of communism and the radically changed relationship between church and state, Poles, both religious and secular, Christian and non-Christian, are only beginning to explore the full meaning of secular government and of true freedom of conscience. This freedom—both in regard to religion and to politics--had been denied to at least two generations of Poles, to the detriment of their ability—as a society, not necessarily as individuals--to exercise both capacities to their full extent, perhaps even to understand the nature of democratic government, religious liberty, and their complex relationship. Richard Neuhaus has posed a question that seems very much current for Poland today: “Our question,” Neuhaus suggested, “can certainly not be the old one of whether religion and politics should

be mixed. They inescapably do mix, like it or not. The question is whether we can devise forms for that interaction which can revive rather than destroy the liberal democracy that is required by a society that would be pluralistic and free” (quoted in Medhurst 158).

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Noemi Marin

From Banned Rhetoric to Public Legitimacy: Religion and National Discourse in Post-Communist Romania¹⁴

Od Zakazanej Retoryki do Publicznej Legitymacji: Religia a Dyskurs Narodowy w Rumunii

Streszczenie

Autorka podchodzi do powiazan pomiedzy retoryka a religia we wspolczesnej Rumunii z dwoch perspektyw: a) stosunkow pomiedzy kosciolem a panstwem w komunistycznej i post-komunistycznej Rumunii, i b) retoryki prezydenckiej po 1989 roku i jej rewizjonistycznego powrotu do religii jako strategii politycznej kompensacji w ramach nowego dyskursu narodowej tozsamosci. Lloyd Bitzer tłumaczy retoryczna koniecznosc jako potrzebe odpowiedzi w obliczu niedoskonalosci ktora jakoby prosi sie o retoryczna interwencje. Powrot religii do sfery polityki w Rumunii wydaje sie byc spowodowany take wlasnie koniecznoscia w trakcie przejscie od dyskursu komunistycznego do post-komunistycznego. Pod prawie pol wieku nieobecności, Kosciol Rumunski i dyskurs religii stal sie znowu czescia dyskursu narodowego, wnoszac ze soba rozmatose argumentow co do legitymacji wladzy i wolnosci religii. Jednoczesnie retoryka prezydencka wnosi jezyk swietosci do zeswiedzonego dyskursu politycznego transformacji. W symboliczny sposob, powiazania pomiedzy religia i polityka przynosza ze soba retoryczne odrodzenie.

The Romanian Revolution started in Timisoara, in December 1989, with a clash between Ceausescu's militia and citizens meeting to exercise their right to freedom of religion. For over 45 years, Romanian Communist Party's politics were able to maintain religious

¹⁴ A shorter version of this article was presented at the 16th Congress of the International Society for the History of Rhetoric, Strasbourg, France, July 24-28, 2007.

discourse outside of the public sphere. Rhetorically, however, Romanian revolution starts emblematically within the master trope of irony¹⁵ (to cite Burke), forcing official discourse to invite religion outside of its silenced public space into the public realm, into a renewed relationship with politics.

Flora, Szilagyí and Roudometof (2005) present the events related to a minority religious community, events that led to the downfall of the Ceausescu's regime:

On December 16 1989, confrontation took place between the local authorities and the religious believers of a Hungarian Reformed community in Timisoara (a city in western Romania). The local church minister, Laszlo Tokes, was an outspoken critic of the oppression of the Hungarian minority and of the Ceausescu plan to destroy thousands of villages. He repeatedly resisted the authorities' attempt to relocate him into a small remote village and thus successfully segregate him from his congregation. When the secret police came to arrest him, members of his religious community showed up to protect him and his family. Soon, huge crowds of ethnic Romanian Orthodox believers joined them. The unprecedented expression of ethnic and inter-confessional solidarity in the streets of Timisoara caused the uprising to spread throughout the country, eventually leading to the end of the Ceausescu dictatorship.¹⁶
(41)

Post-1989, Romanian public sphere has to make discursive room for a rhetorical conjunction of the sacred and the profane.¹⁷ Official discourse *on* and *of* religion re-enters the arena of the political to recapture legitimacy important for both Romanian citizens and post-Ceausescu/post-communist state. Thus, as in most societies in transition in Eastern and Central Europe, Romanian public sphere features two official kinds of discourse on the relationship between religion and politics: a) one on the Romanian Orthodox Church as civic,

¹⁵ Burke, *Language as Symbolic Action: Essays on Life, Literature, and Method*. 1966. Berkeley, U of California P, 1968.

¹⁶ Flora, Gavril, Georgina Szilagyí and Victor Roudometof. "Religion and National Identity in Post-Communist Romania," *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, 7/1, (2005): 35-55.

¹⁷ Eliade, Mircea. *The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion*. 1957. Orlando, Florida: Harcourt, 1987. Eliade is one of the most important historians of religion, and he is of Romanian origin. He died in exile, in the United States, after a long academic life at the University of Chicago.

political, and/or national authority in the state; and b) another on presidential rhetoric that introduces faith-based arguments to re-legitimize the national political arena.

The Bitzerian rhetorical situation¹⁸ explains rhetorical exigence as the need to address an imperfection invites a rhetorical intervention in discourse. The need to re-invite religion into the Romanian political sphere seems to address the rhetorical exigence when transitioning from communist to post-communist discourse. After almost half a century, the Romanian Church and religious rhetoric engage with national discourse, contributing a plethora of political, religious, and civic arguments on sanctified authority and freedom of religion. At the same time, post-communist presidential rhetoric reintroduces words of the sacred into the secularized political discourse of transition. In an emblematic way, the relationship religion-politics brings with it a rhetorical revival (pun intended).¹⁹ This essay explores the relationship religion and rhetoric in post-communist Romania, featuring two brief historical examinations, namely, a) a historical account of communist and post-communist discourse on Church and State, and b) a rhetorical account of post-1989 presidential discourse and its revisionist strategies to reintroduce religion as a political redemptive action, part of a renewed Romanian national rhetoric.

The Historical Context for Religious Rhetoric: A Necessary Exigence

When it comes to the complex relationship State-Church²⁰ in post-communism, a shared problem for most societies in transition is the legacy of communist times, the overruling rhetorical powers of an inherited atheist public discourse, in the name of Communism and Marxism. For half a decade in Romania, the separation of sacred and secular remained the mainstream rhetorical strategy of official governance. Among Eastern and

¹⁸ Bitzer, Lloyd F. "The Rhetorical Situation." *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 1 (1968): 1-14.

¹⁹ I am referring to the American usage of the term Revival, reflecting a specific religious period in American history of public discourse.

²⁰ Capital or small letter spelling of [S]tate and [C]hurch reflect the similar usage of the terms throughout the article.

Central European countries, Poland remains an important exception, as its religious discourse contributes partially to a unique situation of the relationship between religion and politics, in that, “for a historical moment, a beleaguered political regime... entered into dialogue, in effect into a partnership with the Catholic Church to attempt to solve social and economic problems.”²¹ As Ornatowski explains, in Poland “the Catholic Church played a direct political role,” legitimizing the relationship between state and church in its distinctive way, creating its own rhetorical and political case (2007).

For most communist societies, public sphere translates into a sphere where politics and politicized rhetoric leave no room for either a discourse *of* religion or for national churches to engage in dialogue with the authorities in the public realm. Religious topics and ecumenical vocabulary are banned, celebrations and festivities of religious signification moved from the public into the private realm, all in the name of an atheist arena for the ‘new man’ of communist times.²² In other words, the presence of religious rhetoric as part of public discourse is set to be only part of the private sphere. Private reads as a lesser area for citizenry, for the ‘true’ citizenry of communism heralds its activities mainly and importantly in the public realm. Politically and legally, this locus for rhetoric and religion, this separation of the secular and the sacred, translates as a Burkean negative, for, in reality, according to the Romanian Constitution, there is **no** separation between state and church.²³ How, then, an incident that occurred at the end of the historical year 1989, can bring about not just a revolution, a reintroduction of the relationship rhetoric and religion into the public sphere, but

²¹ Ornatowski, Cezar (2007) “Rhetoric, Religion, and Politics in the Negotiations Between the Church and the Authorities in Poland, 1980-1989” Paper presented at the 16th Congress of the International Society for the History of Rhetoric, Strasbourg, France, 24-28 July, 2007.

²² While there is an abundance of political and historical studies on communist era, in terms of rhetorical studies in particular on Romanian rhetoric, there is almost no research to be found. To explicate my reference, Ceausescu’s rhetoric envisions eradication of religion in order to create a new country populated by people like the New Man of Socialism, a national hero-portrait of the Romanian people, an anti-religious, atheist, anti-Western citizen.

²³ Kenneth Burke, *Language as Symbolic Action: Essays on Life, Literature, and Method*. 1966. Berkeley, U of California P, 1968.

also open an entire controversy about the role and function of Romanian Orthodox Church in Romanian political life?

This seems to be the opportune time to announce that, due to the vast problematic of the relationship between religion and politics in post-communist Romania, this article focuses mainly on the relationship among rhetoric, religion, and post-communist politics in relation to the discourse of reconstitution of national Romanian identity in the public sphere. Looking at two discursive intersections between religion and politics in the Romanian public arena, the article offers an account of the rhetorical challenges of State-Church debate on national authority along with rhetorical strategies utilized by Romanian presidents in legitimizing national appeals.

Breaking the Silence: Religion as Political Resistance

In December of 1989, the rhetorical and political silence is broken as religion (re-)enters the arena of official discourse.²⁴ Before that time, as in all communist countries, the Iron Curtain fell also on the religious window, setting its discourse into a cloister of silence, to borrow a religious metaphor. Emblematic of Romanian political life, communist rhetoric manages to eradicate most presence of religious discourse, to ban an entire grammar of religion, to impact and affect the public memory of citizens and comrades together, a rhetorical strategy of consistent silence of religion in the public sphere. As presented in the controversial and important Anti-Communist Report published in December 2006, the Romanian state takes drastic rhetorical measures to cease any possible relationship between religion and official politics.²⁵

²⁴ Bitzer, 1968.

²⁵ *Presidential Commission for the Analysis of Communist Dictatorship in Romania: Final Report*. 1 Jan. 2007. <http://www.presidency.ro/static/ordine/RAPORT_FINAL_CADCR.pdf>.

McKerrow identifies *naming* as part of the rhetorical axioms related to the discourse of dominance and power.²⁶ When applied to the communist context in which religion became silenced, *naming* becomes the primordial rhetorical strategy utilized in communist times to silence any discourse on and of religion--a long lasting discursive attempt to take religion out of the public sphere. In Romania, religious holidays were turned into working days and names were withdrawn from calendars or official sites. That is not to say that such holidays were not part of private discourse and religious dates were not celebrated in the privacy of Romanian homes.²⁷ For instance, in Ceausescu's Romania, 'Christmas' as a word was eradicated, not to be found in any of the official vernacular. The generation born during the 1980s might still recall how in grammar schools and kindergartens the story was told about the death of Father Christmas, only to be replaced by the 'true parents' of Winter Holidays: the General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, and his wife, Comrade Elena Ceausescu.²⁸

During the totalitarian regime, Romanian Communist Party decrees and laws introduce new communist words, with strong atheist social resonance, to replace 'old' Romanian vocabulary pertinent to long standing historical traditions. Once out of the public sphere, religious words leave way for a novel vocabulary of communist rhetoric, a vocabulary populated with words that assist people in their '(re)-construction the Multilaterally-Developed New Citizens' living in the bright 'New Socialist Republic of Romania.'²⁹

²⁶ McKerrow, Raymie E. "Critical Rhetoric: Theory and Praxis." *Communication Monographs* 56 (1989): 91-111.

²⁷ Most citizens are called to work during weekends, and/or religious holidays, a patriotic move to make all citizens of the country remember their mission and political contribution to the multi development of a new socialist country.

²⁸ A most interesting book recently published in Romania sums up the Bucharest people experiences of the 1980s on basis of oral narratives archiving the actual existence of different citizens. The book has been a best-seller this summer, sold out entirely. The Museum of the Romanian Village. LXXX. *The 1980s and the People of Bucharest*. Paideia: Bucharest, 2007.

²⁹ The words in quotation marks intend to demonstrate the flavor of the communist discourse. Important to note, in my view, there is an imperious need to examine communist rhetoric in terms of its stylistic and argumentative patterns, for most rhetorical studies do not feature precisely the transformation of language in Eastern and Central Europe from and to 'wooden language.'

As most rhetoricians know, words do have power and the Romanian Communist Party attests to the rhetorical powers of atheist discourse. During the Ceausescu regime, communist rhetorical strategies to change language and eradicate the religious vocabulary from the public sphere reflect sustained rhetorical efforts to manipulate audiences, changing Romanian vernacular. Most education textbooks, school systems, or even historical monuments turn a-religious. Old historical churches of national importance are either demolished or re-painted to glorify the historical past, rather than its religious tradition.³⁰ No history manual reminds students of Christianity as related to Romania's own past. Following the Soviet model, Romanian history textbooks present a victorious atheist past, forever communist in its glory. Religious education exists only in limited seminaries, where candidates for the priesthood have to pass civic and communist tests in order to justify the need for such a vocation. In gloomy, Orwellian style, the 'rhetoric of eradication' strategically and actively eliminates all reminiscence of a religious past for the Romanian people.

Political Debate on State and Church in Post-Communist Romanian: Religion as Free For All?

As religion as discourse and rhetorical practice under the Romanian totalitarian regime moves to the private sphere, an official political perspective inherited from communism raises even more problems in post-communist times. According to the Romanian Constitution of 1948, State and Church are not separate--a legal stipulation that remains current to this day. Bria (1999) notes that "among the countries formerly under state socialist regimes, Romania had the most 'Constantinian Church,' rendering the separation between church and state impossible, in both the past and the present"(4). Pre-1989, the Romanian Socialist Republic develops a *modus operandi* with the Romanian Orthodox Church, a "social apostolate" based on biblical principles. As Bria explains, *divinitas and civitas* translate into "Christians should

³⁰ One such church is Tescani, located in the district of Bacau. Tescani was owned by George Enescu, the national composer, and his wife, a 'bourgeois' Rosetti family member.

obey the civil authorities” since the (Romanian Communist) State stands for a morally legitimate entity where the Church, as part of it, should not and will not advocate civil disobedience (Bria, 1999, 4).

From this standpoint, the public argument that in Romania Church and religious rhetoric are not included in the public realm can be seen as problematic, for the discourse *on* and *by* the Church relates to its official contributions under its authority as a constitutional entity during communist times. Hence, it is important to note that while the Romanians as a people were not allowed to engage in religious rhetoric in the public realm, the Church official discourse is (silently) embedded into the political canvas of official discourse of the State. Why is it important to make this distinction from a rhetorical standpoint? Precisely because after 1989, the arguments on official religious discourse and freedom of religious practices lead to dramatic rhetorical consequences that affect both the Romanian Constitution adopted in 1993 and the ongoing public debate on the role of the Romanian Orthodox Church as the National Church of current Romania.

As part of the legacy of the communist period, most Eastern and Central European countries face public debates on religious victims of communism; on the legitimacy of religion as part of nationalist rhetoric; and on religious and political rights for the minorities. The list is not only shared, but also painfully long. In Romania, the communist legacy brings religion and its complex discursive facets into multiple arguments that populate the already challenging political life. In the aftermath of the communist era, the public debate on freedom of religion reveals how arguments about and on religion populate both the Church official discourse as well as partisan debates on legitimacy and political rights for various religions and religious groups. Defending the National (Romanian) Church as the only and most

legitimate body to continue the social apostolate that contributed to a continuum of religious life under communist regime, Bria³¹ states that:

The most negative description of post-communist Romania is that of a religious vacuum, a spiritual desert, a fertile field for mission. This picture becomes the alibi of Western evangelists, Eastern religious movements, and missionary agencies coming to Romania to fill the gap and conquer a new religious public. (169)

Arguments on religion and National Romanian Orthodox rights to political authority, along with arguments and freedom of religion find their ways in the creation and re-creation of the new Constitution of Romania, a painful process that took place in early 1990s. Immediately after 1989, a strenuous and to this day continuous debate on the freedom of (which) religion surfaces, giving way to an array of discursive challenges and rhetorical actions in reference to the relationship State-Church, national church vs. minority's churches, and public and private roles of religion. Pope (1999) acknowledges that "the Revolution brought about important changes within Romanian society at large and for *the religious communities in particular* (my emphasis)."³² During the winter of 1990, The National Salvation Front (provisional Romanian Government)³³ re-legalizes the Greek Catholic Church (also called the Uniates) suppressed by the communists, maintaining the legal status of fourteen other religious communities (recognized under Ceausescu) and allowing them for the first time to govern themselves.³⁴

³¹ Bria (1999) argues for the post-communist unique rights of a Romanian National Church, retelling the story of communist times, when: "[T]he Patriarch did not attempt to transform the church into a ghetto of pious orthodox or into a refuge of political groups hostile to communism. Only during Ceausescu's regime (late- who considered himself a messiah in the history of Romania) did it become evident (for the church) that the regime was an oppressive system, so by mid 1980s, when Orthodox lost 30 churches in a so-called 'urban systematization' of Bucharest, it was too late to change the terms of the state-church relationship (constituted in 1948)." (168)

³² Pope, Earl, A. (1999). "Ecumenism, Religious Freedom, and the 'National Church' Controversy in Romania." *Journal of Ecumenical Studies*, 36.1 (1999): 184-201.

³³ Front of Salvation Front (1989-Feb 1, 1990); February-May, 1990- Provisional Council for National Unity; May 1990, Ion Iliescu is elected President of Romania. Ion Iliescu, "Chronological Summary of Romanian History." 265-269. In *Romania at the Moment of Truth*, Henri Berger: Paris. 1994.

³⁴ Pope, 184.

While everybody acknowledges the victimization of Greek Catholics during communism, the position of Orthodoxy reflects current heated discussions on partisan rhetoric and nationalist discourse. Bria offers such an example:

None deny that the sufferings of the Greek Catholic Church and its victims and martyrs under the communist regime constitute a national problem, but the Romanian Unites spoke against the current privileged status of the Orthodox Church and asked for punishment of the compromised leaders. While the Orthodox are not saints, it is senseless to denigrate their Christian commitment solely because they did not organize an anti-communist movement and social opposition. There is a credible and faithful remnant in the church that does not reject the claims of the Greek Catholics to repossess their properties. (171)

A brief history of the legal debate on the New Constitution of Romania approved in 1993 reflects the fluid, unsettled rhetorical dimension of the relationship State-Church. Immediately after the revolution, the Hungarian Protestant Churches (Lutheran, Reformed and Unitarian) join in a rare coalition with the Latin Rite Catholic Church in Transylvania in adopting a document that calls for a free church in a free society. From 1991 to 1993, the New Romanian Constitution is formulated, debated, and finalized. Approved by the Parliament in November 1991, the negotiations on its final version call for a rhetorical and ecumenical reading of several articles. Article 29 states that freedom of religious belief cannot be restricted in any way and that freedom of conscience is guaranteed, but that it must be expressed in a spirit of tolerance and mutual respect. The religious communities remain free by Constitution, yet all forms of controversy seem to be prohibited.³⁵ As part of Article 1, under General Principles, the State recognizes and guarantees national minorities the right to preserve, develop, and express their ethnic/cultural/linguistic/religious identity.³⁶ Further on, Art.32 emphasizes freedom of religious education in accordance with the specific requirements of each faith. The Baptist religious groups, attentive to the Constitutional

³⁵ Pope (1999) provides extensive coverage of the process, and its rhetorical and religious implications.

³⁶ Some minority churches consistently argue that this right is still not honored.

discussion, propose the phrase ‘by the Grace of God’ to be added to Article 1.³⁷ Along with the new Constitution, another legal document, the Law of Cults, valid since 1948, goes through similar revisions, ample sets of drafts (1991, 1992, and 1993) and multiple articles (78) only to articulate freedom of churches, without calling for a strict separation of Church and State.³⁸

The New Romanian Constitution (1993) does not stipulate an official (state) church, accepting all religious communities as equal before the law. However, a decade-and-a-half later, the ecumenical situation presents a less-than-successful (legal) picture: new religious legislation is not yet completed, and mounting fears re-populate the public discourse on religious freedom. In the last days of 2006, right before Romania’s long-anticipated integration into the European Union, the Romanian Parliament passed a law in favor of a National Church, that is, the Romanian Orthodox Church.³⁹ Adding to the public debate on the role of an official state church, on freedom of religion and legitimacy of religious groups, arguments to justify National Orthodox Church continue to populate the political sphere.⁴⁰ Pope (1999) almost a decade ago identified the current ecumenical fears shared by minority churches in light of the strong support for a National Church in Romanian politics:

The question remains however as to who will have the courage to tell the majority churches with all their political and social power that they also engage in forms of proselytism by claiming to possess the absolute truth and demeaning other perspectives, by creating and communicating caricatures of other religious communities or demonizing them, by demanding restrictions on the religious freedom of other groups because of their love of power, by instilling false fears regarding the subversion of the nation that they maintain they alone can defend against, and by encouraging discriminatory actions or even outright violence against those who would challenge their religious monopoly. (198)

³⁷ Article 1 read previously, “Romania is a national state, sovereign, unitary, and indivisible.”

³⁸ Pope, 190.

³⁹ The Law was proposed by the current president, Traian Basescu. See, Dragos Lucian, “Romania: Religion Law Rushed In,” *Habitusnetwork.org*, February 1, 2007, Retrieved July 14, 2007.

⁴⁰ Corley, Felix. “Romania: Controversial Religion Law’s Passing Violated Parliamentary Process,” *Forum 18 News Services*, 15 December 2006, <http://www.forum18.org> Retrieved 7/14/2007

Presidential Rhetoric and Religious Vocabulary: Faith-Based Exigence

When examining post-communist Presidential rhetoric, irony continues to function as the master trope, revealing how official discourse utilizes religion as a legitimation strategy to reconnect citizens' fight for democracy with articulations of religious freedom for a unifying argument of national identity. While the previously mentioned debate on the political legitimacy of the National Church remains unresolved, post-1989 presidential rhetoric provides a coherent approach to religion as an exigence for civic ethos. After silencing religion in the public sphere during the communist regime, Romanian presidents, starting with the former communist Ion Iliescu, recognize the need to re-introduce religion into official discourse as part of the new rhetoric of democratic values. From a legal standpoint, State and Church continue to remain one, from 1948 on. However, the presidential rhetoric of the 1990s attempts a re-legitimation of religion, that is to say, of Christian Orthodox religion as an identifying and unifying argument of national (Romanian) identity. From early 1990s on, all Romanian presidents address the nation every Easter and Christmas, gradually introducing powerful religious presence and faith-based arguments to contribute to the 'national thread' of Romanian existence.⁴¹ Religion, along with national history, becomes strategically present in presidential discourse to provide renewed political legitimacy for all democratic and civic discourse. Thus, for almost two decades, post-communist presidential rhetoric incorporates religion to add redemption and new authority to the political narrative of 'free' and 'freed' Romanian people.

⁴¹ That is not to say that Romanian presidency is faith-based or containing similar religious tones as the American current presidency. Rather, it introduces religion as topic and acknowledgment of a unifying sort, to invoke appeals of national history and past religious fervor, needed to reconstruct a nation.

Sharing this view with other historians and political analysts, Beyer⁴² predicts that religion in Eastern and Central Europe follows already known trends. Viewing religion as a cultural marker of national identity, he states that:

Religion in Eastern and Central Europe will follow more closely a twin pattern that has already manifested itself strongly in most other parts of the world: namely, there will be simultaneous trends toward the privatization of religion as the affair of the individual person, and the politicization of religion as part of a wider context over the identity and character of the nation and cultures. (21)

The history of the Romanian presidency post-1989 reflects a transition from communist atheist rhetoric to a more inclusive (not all-inclusive) post-communist rhetoric, where State and Church continue to remain together and religion becomes legitimized in the process. Several years after the Romanian revolution, religion offers novel rhetorical strategies to legitimize both presidential personae and political views on the post-communist civic ethos and democracy. After all, *all* elected presidents of post-1989 Romania, the current one included, had been previously part of the Romanian Communist Party, part of the atheist public discourse during Ceausescu's regime. If so, how can such presidents legitimize a more inclusive discourse on religion and legitimacy of religion after silenced times?⁴³

I mentioned irony before. It seems there is a direct relationship between presidential personae and religion: the more extensive the communist past of the elected Romanian president (Ion Iliescu, in this case), the least religious the ethos. The most civically engaged president, Emil Constantinescu, represents the most ecumenically-driven discourse in post-communist Romanian history. Irony allows for a rhetorical explanation of the exigence perceived by all Romanian presidents to legitimize and redeem their public persona through

⁴² Beyer, Peter. "Privatization and Politicization of Religion in Global Society: Implications for Church-State Relations in Central and Eastern Europe." *Church-State Relations in Central and Eastern Europe*. Irena Borowik, Ed. Krakow: Nomos. 21.

⁴³ In *After The Fall*, I suggest a theoretical perspective called critical cultural anagogic approach, where under oppressive political contexts, invocation of the silenced past legitimizes identification, and strengthens the position of the speaker. See Noemi Marin, *After the Fall: "Toward A Rhetoric of Exile and Dissent: The Return of the Rhetor."* 157-169. New York: Peter Lang, 2007.

rhetorical strategies that link *divinitas* and *civitas* in the name of a ‘true’ Romanian democracy. Religion as a civic argument of redemption starts to be introduced in presidential addresses in the early 1990s (1994) and turns into annual presidential addresses on religious holidays, namely on Christian Orthodox religious holidays. Once again, the relationship between rhetoric and religion in post-1989 Romania offers a rich rhetorical site for historical exploration!

The last part of this article examines chronologically how presidential addresses from 1994 use the relationship between *divinitas* and *civitas* in order to both redeem presidents as public and rhetorical personae and to re-legitimize national identity arguments in post-communist Romania.

Romania has had four presidential elections since 1990, and an interim President (Ion Iliescu, 1990-1992). The elected presidents of Romania include, in chronological order, Ion Iliescu (1992-1996; 2000-2004), Emil Constantinescu (1996-2000), and Traian Basescu (2004-current). It is noteworthy that all of them had been members of the Romanian Communist Party; as post-communist elected presidents, they represent, respectively, the Romanian Social Democratic party (Ion Iliescu), the Civil Alliance (Emil Constantinescu), and the Liberal Party (Traian Basescu).

Iliescu’s Rhetoric: From Atheist to Politically Religious

After serving as Interim President for two years, Ion Iliescu becomes officially the President of Romania in 1992 for the first time. A former communist (yet revolutionary) and a democratic public persona, Iliescu recognizes the rhetorical power of religion, removing it from the silenced private sphere into the public, introducing presidential addresses on Christian Orthodox holidays. During his term, annual speeches on Christian Orthodox Easter and Christmas holidays enter presidential discourse to remain to this day. After a long

totalitarian history of public address, in 1995 Iliescu speaks to the Romanian nation using the Christian salutation, “Christ Is Risen!”--a remarkable rhetorical move for a former communist (born-again democratic) politician! And yet, while mentioning religion and using religious idiom, Iliescu focuses more on historical and national appeals that align Romanians as Christians to civic and national identity. “For over two millennia, every year, the Romanian people live in joy and renewed hope, along with all Christian people of the world, the deeply significant spiritual moment that is today’s Easter Holiday”⁴⁴(my translation). A short speech, like most of his speeches on religious themes, Iliescu invokes the December 1989 victims, the new political and national trajectory of post-communist Romania, and arguments of renewal and revival of national traditions and customs. Combining national pride, civic engagement and embedded religious tones, Iliescu (1995) announces the celebration of Christian Easter for all Romanians, ending with “Happy Holidays, Fellow Citizens!”--an appropriate finale in a country experiencing full rhetorical and political transition!

Tying religion and history together as powerful rhetorical allies for public legitimation, Iliescu utilizes throughout his presidency (during both of his terms) an increasingly religious ethos to commemorate and celebrate the Romanian nation. For example, speaking to honor the 136 years since the Romanian Principates Unification, Iliescu (1995) introduces a messianic tone (in its Romanian version) to link with the Romanian pre-communist (hence long-standing Christian) tradition, in an effort to re-legitimize, and re-empower Romanian national identity for its people.⁴⁵

On this occasion, today, I wish you, the participants in this gathering, as well as all citizens of our country, peace, well-being and happiness. May the *warm light of the/our Unification guide us* (my emphasis) in all we are to accomplish together, toward enabling our aspiration to freedom to take place, toward a change for the better in our Romania! (my translation)

⁴⁴ I translated all presidential addresses utilized in this part of the article. I also utilize the years to identify the speeches, since most of them are listed in Romanian on the official presidential site, www.presidency.ro

⁴⁵ Iliescu, 1995.

His second presidential term (2000-2004) continues with a much more overt strategy to link religious ethos to Romanian history to Romanian national identity. In 2001, in the (already) ‘traditional’ post-communist Easter address, the Romanian president utilizes the calendar date as a unifying argument for all Christians:

As a symbol of unity and harmony among people, this year the entire Christian World celebrates the Rebirth of Our Lord at the same date! Even more so, it is a joy for me, as President of Romania, to address all of you, all the Christians of our country, regardless of the religious order (confession), making the traditional confession: Christ Is Risen! (my translation)

Winning a second term, he continues to utilize powerful faith-based addresses. Only seven years from a much more subdued peroration (1995), Iliescu ends this address with fully-fledged ecumenical rhetoric, wishing his fellow citizens the following:

In this sacred night, the joy of the Rebirth of Our Lord to overflow in your souls, and may Christ who conquered death give us life, health, peace, and prosperity. Christ is Risen!” (my translation)

The rhetorical crescendo and the epideictic ease with which Iliescu moves through religious and political discourse can be exemplified with a (yet again ironic) citation, namely the celebration of May 1, a date that reminds all post-communist nations of their communist past. Epitomizing the discursive need to bridge *divinitas* and *civitas* in order to offer re-newed legitimacy to his presidency, Iliescu in the same speech (2002) identifies the May 1 International Day as the fight of the working class for rights and freedom, for civic duty and sacrifice (all part of the communist rhetoric) to follow after a couple of paragraphs with a glorification of Christian life. In his own words, “[D]uring these days of celebration, which precede through a happy coincidence the Paschal celebration of the Rebirth of Our Lord Jesus Christ, I wish all Romanians Happy Holidays and may all their dreams and hopes become

reality. I believe in our strength to overcome obstacles and act as a unified force for our common good.”⁴⁶ Such rhetorical articulations and arguments might be seen as efficient discursive strategies that contribute to legitimize public personae, since Iliescu’s presidency has been the longest in post-communist Romania.

Constantinescu’s Religiosity: Civic and Divine?

Following Iliescu’s first term, Emil Constantinescu, President of Romania from 1996-2000, represents the Civic Alliance of the Democratic forces in Romanian politics. Surprising for a former and current academic,⁴⁷ Constantinescu’s orations expand on the ecumenical style as his addresses use an overt Christian Orthodox rhetoric in a large number of speeches. In 1999, speaking on the occasion of Pope John Paul II visit to Romania, Constantinescu’s welcoming remarks reflect a true ecumenical vernacular:

Your Holiness, I welcome you with the certitude that God intended for us to live this most significant moment which is too close for us to realize its full importance.... We, as sons of God, are fully responsible for any disrespect and abuse of freedom and liberty, for each and every citizen. We welcome you on Romanian soil and we ask you, on behalf of the sons of this nation, to bless us under your apostolate! (my translation)

Very soon afterward, reflecting on the Pope John Paul II visit, Constantinescu honors the Romanian Patriarch Teoctist, a contested political and religious figure,⁴⁸ utilizing Christian Orthodox style and heavy religious tone on May 21, 1999:

We all witnessed the blessed visit (John Paul II) in this last month... Tradition states that the Emperor Constantin saw the cross sign in the sky and hence received the message. In hoc

⁴⁶ Iliescu, 2002. In Romanian, the salutation (La Multi Ani) used at the very end of the speech is utilized both in religious and lay discourse, as a wish for Happy Anniversary, Happy New Year, Happy Birthday, and Happy Holidays. Quite a convenient salutation for presidential addresses like the one mentioned!

⁴⁷ Emil Constantinescu is currently the President of the University of Bucharest, a position he took immediately following his end of presidential term in 2004.

⁴⁸ Another public debate on the role of Church and State in communist times was stemmed by the death of the Romanian Patriarch, Teoctist, on August 5, 2007.

signo vinces! Let us see a sign to make us all Christians reconcile and live together, stepping into the new millennium together!

Constantinescu's presidential rhetoric appears faith-based, for along with public addresses on religious holidays, he engages citizens in an almost messianic discourse for the New Year and the New Millennium (December 31, 1999). Inviting Romanians to revisit the history of the last Millennium and reflect on it when entering the new millennium with (anew) religious and civic vigor, Constantinescu offers a unique rhetorical appeal to transform the nation, as he fuses patriotic and Christian values to enforce a strong sense of civic and religious mission for Romanians in the future:

Faith is not an empty word, rather, it is the law that unifies and heightens/lifts our spirit. History has given us such moments of faith and hope, among which was the visit of John Paul II. This visit, after a millennium of schism,⁴⁹ has opened the gates to re-unify with the Christians of Europe. God has chosen our country and our old/ancient Christian people to take the first step for this grand Christian reconciliation ... I wish you a Happy New Year, joy, and happiness in your lives and *souls* (my emphasis)(my translation).

One needs to revisit irony as a powerful trope for presidential speeches. Among the post-communist presidents post-1989, Emil Constantinescu, when elected, was viewed as the most progressive president, representing, in communist vernacular, the intellectual social class. And yet, Constantinescu's rhetoric, unlike the rest of presidential discourse post-1989, carries the strongest religious content and ecumenical style. Some of his speeches read as religious confessions, an example being his 2000 traditional presidential address on Easter, a voice almost from the pulpit.⁵⁰

Christ is Risen! Today, on the Day full of light of faith and hope, I send you all a message of joy and gratitude. Joy, because the Holy Days of Easter makes us all Romanian people gather to celebrate the rebirth of our Savior. Grateful, because, on this holy day, more than any other

⁴⁹ "Schism" here refers to the Christian history of departure between Orthodoxy and Catholicism.

⁵⁰ The translation of the titles of the presidential addresses in different presidential terms is indicative of the transition from a civic tone to a more religious one. Constantinescu's address title carries reads: The Presidential Message for the Holy Easter, April 30, 2000."

time, we face each other and thank each other for all the good things which, known or unknown, we have accomplished for the benefit of our fellow human beings and for the benefit of our country! (my translation)

It is of note that during his presidential term, Constantinescu initiates the plan to build the Cathedral of National Salvation in Bucharest. His arguments focus on religion as the way to attain democratic life, preaching tolerance and mutual understanding, civic values, and European unity, inviting Romania to partake and have a role in the global future of the New Europe.

Basescu: A Rhetorical Move to the Middle

Similar to Iliescu's presidential rhetoric, the current president of Romania, Traian Basescu (2004-current) attempts a rhetorical balance between *civitas* and *divinitas*. Willing to acknowledge and justify religion as an inherent part of the public argument for Romanian national identity, Basescu suggests that the main force of the Romanian people is their faith in God, which enables them to remain strong only by maintaining hope and humility as Christians. However, a former communist himself, an advocate of a pro-American and pro-European Union foreign policy, Basescu's discourse focuses more on religion as tradition and mission to assist the economic and political development of the country. On the occasion of celebrating 80 years since Romanian Orthodox Church became a Patriarchate, Basescu (2004) offers a lucrative platform to legitimize the institutional and constitutional ties between state and church. Along similar lines, his yearly addresses on Easter and Christmas engage less religiosity and feature more political dimensions of contemporary Romanian history, a period for the people to focus on European integration and economic growth.

Overall, the brief chronological account of the relationship between Romanian presidential rhetoric and religion emphasizes the need to reintroduce strategies of legitimacy as political redemptive actions within the framework of post-communist national rhetoric in

Romania. Such rhetorical perspective calls for important questions and explorations on the future of the relationship between religion and rhetoric in Romania.

Conclusion: In the Beginning There Was the Word

Looking at the complex relationship between religion and rhetoric in post-communist Romania, scholars need to explore the role of religion related to political legitimacy in nationalist and/or democratic rhetoric. Others might examine the role of rhetoric for the new or reinstated ecumenical discourse in civic alliances and new European contexts. To what extent can Romanian Orthodox identity be seen as inherent to national identity discourse remains an open question that calls for further investigations of the role of religion in ethno-national rhetoric in post-communism. For international perspectives on Eastern and Central European rhetoric, the notions of public and publics might highlight yet other layers of discursive complexity related to the relationship between religion and rhetoric. To study the relationships between religion and rhetoric as part of the public discourse in societies in transition (such as Romania), means to engage with some of the most important problematic for contemporary rhetorical theory in this global time.

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Ekaterina V. Haskins

Religion, Cultural Memory, and the Rhetoric of National Identity in Russia

Religia, Pamięć Kulturowa, a Retoryka Tożsamości Narodowej w Rosji

Streszczenie

Poczynając od zwycięstwa nad Napoleonem w 1812 roku, religia stała się centralnym elementem Rosyjskiej tożsamości narodowej. W okresie komunistycznym, totalitarne państwo opierało się na szczątkowych uczuciach religijnych w celu mobilizowania społeczeństwa w czasie wojny, a dysydenci widzieli religię jako źródło moralnej odwagi wobec ucisku politycznego. Wzrost pluralizmu politycznego i rozszerzenie przestrzeni wolności religijnej w latach perestrojki stworzyły warunki do powrotu zapomnianego bądź stumionego dziedzictwa kulturowego. Jako jedne z głównych ofiar reżimu sowieckiego, religia w ogóle a szczególnie Prawosławie pojawiły się jako gotowe źródła autorytetu kulturowego i wznoszenia duchowego. Opierając się na pojęciach Kenneth'a Burke'a, autorka sugeruje, że odnośniki do religii w wielu odmianach narratywow tożsamości narodowej, które pojawiły się w rezultacie perestrojki, oferowały swojego rodzaju "ekwipunek do życia" (Burke, *Philosophy of Literary Form*), jak i "struktury akceptacji" bądź też "odrzućcia" (Burke, *Attitudes Toward History*) w atmosferze duchowej pustki i kryzysu zbiorowej tożsamości spowodowanych upadkiem wiary w legitymizujące mity Marksizmu-Leninizmu.

"The influx of new people into the Church, the passion for ancient Russian culture and also enthusiasm for philosophy and literature of the Russian renaissance of the 20th century indicate that today's necessary reunification with the stolen past has already begun. But along with its great riches, the past also conceals quite a few temptations within itself" (Gorski 387).

These words, written by a Soviet dissident intellectual in 1972, acquired new relevance in the years before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of "perestroika" (restructuring) and "glasnost" (openness), begun as reforms within the upper echelons of the Communist Party in the mid-eighties, helped to erode the officially fostered

piety for the Communist party's version of Soviet history. Increased political pluralism and expansion of religious freedom in the years of perestroika created opportunities for appropriation of the nation's forgotten or suppressed cultural heritage. As one of the main victims of the Soviet regime, religion in general and Orthodox religion in particular appeared as a ready source of cultural authority and spiritual transcendence. Appeals to religion in discourses of perestroika, however, indicate the emergence of a variety of narratives of national self-definition, each offering a kind of "equipment for living" (Burke *Philosophy of Literary Form*) in an atmosphere of spiritual vacuum and collective identity crisis brought upon by a collapse of faith in the legitimizing myth of Marxism-Leninism.

In this essay, I argue that Gorski's warning was indeed prophetic in that the "temptations of the past," especially the appeal of nationalistic interpretation of Russian religious and cultural heritage, became irresistible. However, I would also like to suggest that such appeal turned out to be more rhetorically compelling as a unification device because it emphasized what Burke would call a frame of acceptance while those who advocated a more critical attitude toward the past neglected the importance of symbolism in the construction of national identity.

My argument builds upon Kenneth Burke's theory of identification as it relates to his concepts of equipment for living and frames of acceptance and rejection. To this end, I first set up Burke's definitions of these terms and interpret their applicability to the case study. I then trace the symbolic importance of religion in discourses of national self-definition in modern Russia before and after the revolution. Finally, I turn to the years of perestroika to explore the use of appeals to religion by liberal activists, apologists for Stalin, and Russian nationalists to illustrate the ways in which religious moral authority and religious idiom were appropriated across the political spectrum to formulate different attitudes to Russian and Soviet past and present.

Identification, Equipment for Living, and Frames of Acceptance and Rejection

One of Burke's most widely recognized contributions to rhetorical theory is the notion of identification. Developed in the tumultuous political climate of the nineteen thirties and forties, Burke's theory helps to explain how individuals and social groups establish, for better or for worse, a sense of communal belonging and purpose. No two people are alike, and whatever sameness is asserted of them (or by them) is already a symbolic construct. As a discursive process that creates a feeling of "consubstantiality" for otherwise separate individuals, "identification is affirmed with earnestness precisely because there is division. Identification is compensatory to division. If men were not apart from one another, there would be no need for a rhetorician to proclaim their unity. If men were wholly and truly of one substance, absolute communication would be of man's very essence" (*Rhetoric* 22). Burke's definition of rhetoric through metaphor—"rhetoric is concerned with the state of Babel after the Fall"--vividly underscores the condition of division and strife out of which rhetorically crafted unity might arise (*Rhetoric* 23). It is therefore particularly suitable for analyzing public rhetoric in societies in transition.

Because proclamations of unity are rhetorical, they can be more or less persuasive. Burke spent most of his career trying to understand why certain appeals to unity succeed and others fail. His address to the American Writers Congress on the subject of "revolutionary symbolism" in America, for example, criticized Leftist intellectuals for overlooking the power of the word "people" as a unification device. On the other hand, in his analysis of Hitler's *Mein Kampf* Burke shows how the sinister yet highly effective Nazi rhetoric was based on the "bastardization of fundamentally religious patterns of thought" (*Philosophy* 219).

To Burke, all genres of discourse—from overtly rhetorical political speeches and pamphlets to seemingly apolitical poems—aspire to evoke in their audiences a set of shared

attitudes: “Critical and imaginative works are answers to questions posed by the situation in which they arose. They are not merely answers, they are strategic answers, stylized answers” (*Philosophy* 1). Central to his argument is the assumption that there is no neutral vocabulary for assessing our historical reality, that human beings must rely on a “weighted” vocabulary to make sense of their world and to persuade others to adopt this interpretation.

Consequently, the relative persuasiveness of a discourse depends not so much on how accurately it describes a given historical situation, as on how aptly it “equips” its audience “for living” (*Philosophy of Literary Form*). Burke points to proverbs as the simplest, most ubiquitous example of symbolic equipment for living: “Proverbs are *strategies* for dealing with *situations*. In so far as situations are typical and recurrent in a given social structure, people develop names for them and strategies for handling them. Another name for strategies might be *attitudes*” (*Philosophy* 296-297). Extrapolating from this example, Burke suggests that not only can “such analysis of proverbs encompass the whole field of literature,” but also that “the kind of observation from this perspective should apply beyond literature to life in general” (*Philosophy* 296).

Therefore, a poem, a film, a philosophical essay or a political speech equally qualify as specimens of attitudinal discourse. Burke elaborates in *Attitudes toward History*:

In the face of anguish, injustice, disease, and death one adopts policies. One constructs his notion of the universe or history, and shapes attitudes in keeping. Be he poet or scientist, one defines the ‘human situation’ as amply as his imagination permits; then, with this ample definition in mind, he singles out certain functions or relationships as either friendly or unfriendly. If they are deemed friendly, he prepares himself to welcome them; if they are deemed unfriendly, he weighs objective resistance against his own sources, to decide how far he can effectively go in combating them. (3-4).

These attitudes toward history, according to Burke, are typically framed by strategies of acceptance or rejection. Acceptance is “the more or less organized system of meanings by which a thinking man gauges the historical situation and adopts a role with relation to it”

(*Attitudes* 5). “Acceptance” does not mean “passiveness”: since strategies whose mode is acceptance “name both friendly and unfriendly forces, they fix attitudes that prepare for the combat. They draw the lines of battle—and they appear ‘passive’ only to one whose frame would persuade him to draw the line of battle differently” (*Attitudes* 20). Burke illustrates this shift in emphasis by contrasting Thomas Aquinas and Karl Marx with regard to “the existence of social classes”:

The difference between Marx and Aquinas is in the attitude (incipient program of action) taken towards the existence of classes. Since Aquinas, following Augustine, looked upon classes (with attendant phenomena of government, property, and slavery) as punishment for the fall of man, his frame was designed to accept the inevitability of classes, and to build a frame of action accordingly. Marx, on the other hand, accepted the need for eliminating classes, hence he drew the line of battle differently. (*Attitudes* 20-21).

Rejection differs from acceptance by its emphasis on a “shift in allegiance to symbols of authority” (*Attitudes* 21). Thus, the authors of the Communist manifesto were “stressing the *no* more strongly than the *yes*,” and therefore their “project for redemption” was clothed in “negativistic terms, as a *specter that haunts*; and in parting they address themselves to the *anger of slaves* (*Attitudes* 22). Emphasis on rejection often puts a rhetor at a disadvantage as far as the completeness of his persuasive project is concerned: “Frames stressing the ingredient of *rejection* tend to lack the well-rounded quality of a *complete* here-and-now philosophy.” It is not surprising, then, that Marx compensated his rejection of here-and-now

order by laying “the foundations for a vast public enterprise out of which a new frame of acceptance could be constructed” (*Attitudes* 29).

Religious discourse in general is perhaps the most complete frame of acceptance available in so far as it provides believers with an explanation of their place within history as part of the divine macrocosm and within their social milieu as a domain of politics. In Christianity, accepting the existence of inequality and strife as part of the sinful nature of human beings motivates one to seek transcendence through one’s relationship to the divine. Thus the saying of Christ, “Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and unto God the things that are God’s” is a program of action whereby one is exhorted to follow a spiritual path of moral amelioration and to find refuge in the kingdom of God.

Invocations of religious attitudes do not occur in a vacuum, however, and every historical and cultural context burdens them with political significations. It is enough to mention, for example, the concept of the “manifest destiny” to demonstrate how religious idiom is pressed into the service of a nationalist agenda. In Russia, the rhetoric of Orthodox Christianity was similarly aligned with a discourse of Russia’s unique mission in the world. From a rhetorical standpoint, then, it is important to trace the historical fusion of religion and discourses of national identity.

Religion and national identity in Russia before and after the Revolution

To understand the role of religion in appeals to Russian nationhood, one must go back to the rule of Peter the Great (1682-1725), the first monarch who attempted to make Russia into a European nation by introducing vast changes in virtually all spheres of life, including religious practices. While his predecessors, including Ivan the Terrible, were still beholden to the Orthodox Church for their political legitimacy, Peter abolished the institution of the

Patriarchate and replaced it with the Holy Synod, a state administration under the authority of the tsar. Coupled with the secularization of education and a turn to European customs among the nobility, the reforms within the Church effectively widened the gap between the elites (landed gentry and state servants) and the rest of the population, the majority of which were peasant serfs.

Throughout the eighteenth century, Russian monarchs continued Peter's European-oriented policies, and their educated subjects, most of whom were either instructed by foreign tutors or studied abroad, were alienated from their native traditions. In the absence of a civil society based on the rule of law, the Orthodox religion alone remained the common cultural denominator that could unite the subjects of a Russian tsar into a nation. Consequently, the construction of national identity in the nineteenth century often became a matter of rhetorically bridging the chasm between the "people," politically dispossessed yet presumably patriotic carriers of cultural traditions, and the free educated "public."

A central event that catalyzed arguments over Russian national identity in the nineteenth century was the victory of the Russian army over Napoleon in 1812. On Christmas day of that year, tsar Alexander the First issued a decree ordering the construction of a church-monument to commemorate the event and to offer thanks for divine intercession. The monarch's gesture was symbolically weighted: the church was to be built in Moscow, Russia's capital before Peter the Great, and the language of the decree mentioned the "Russian folk" (*narod Rossijskij*) as the chief instrument of the divine providence.

Despite the patriotic fervor incited by the common victory among the different social classes, Alexander's gesture toward the "folk" did not translate into a policy of emancipation, and the serfs were not freed for another half century. But the impact of the event on the educated classes was nothing short of transformative. For decades after, intellectual and political debates in the country revolved around the question of Russian identity and destiny.

In these debates, religion was particularly relevant to the efforts to define the “substance” of the Russian nation.

In the nineteenth century, arguments about Russian identity and destiny crystallized into two opposing camps, known as the “Westernizers” and the “Slavophiles”. Westernizers saw Russia lagging behind Europe because of its backward culture and the servile passivity of its people in the face of autocratic rule. One of the major Westernizers was Petr Chaadaev, an educated nobleman who for his radical views was pronounced insane by tsar Nicholas I. Chaadaev’s *Philosophical Letters* epitomize the frame of rejection by stressing the abject lack of anything culturally redeeming about Russia: “Isolated by a strange destiny from the universal progress of humanity, we have derived nothing from those ideas which have transmitted continuity to the human species ... If we wished to evolve an attitude resembling that of other civilized peoples, we would, as it were, have to repeat for ourselves the entire process of the education of the human race”(164).

Although he did offer a solution—to “civilize the race” by bringing it into the family of European nations united by Catholic religion—Chaadaev’s frame of acceptance did not appeal to native resources of identity. One had to have already embraced Western cultural norms and customs in order to assent to this image of unity.

The Westernizers on the whole failed to articulate a compelling vision of a people based on native cultural traditions, including religion. As Vera Tolz comments, Westernizers “preached ‘universal values’ represented by ‘Western civilization’ and expected that with time, as autocracy and serfdom disappeared and the peasantry was educated, Russia would enter the European political mainstream. The peculiarities of the Russian historical and cultural tradition, for instance the impact of Orthodoxy, were of no particular interest to them. In the future most Russian liberals would remain cosmopolitans in the Enlightenment mode” (65-66).

Where the Westernizers saw lack, the Slavophiles saw infinite though not yet realized strength. For them, in order to redeem Russia, the educated classes had to identify with “the people”—politically downtrodden yet genuinely patriotic bearers of authentic cultural traditions. Nineteenth-century Slavophiles (among them poet Fyodor Tiutchev and philosopher Alexis Khomyakov and Ivan Kireevsky) considered Russia a distinct civilization based on the Orthodox faith, Slavic ethnicity, and the communal institutions of a predominantly peasant population. Russia was more than a country—it was a spiritual force that transcended historical particulars (Billington 12-13; Riasanovsky *Russia and the West*).

Many of the Slavophiles espoused a messianic belief in Russia as a “God chosen people.” Writer Konstantin Aksakov, for example, thus describes God’s gifts to Russia in reward for its purity and humility:

And God exalted humble Rus’! Forced into desperate struggle by belligerent neighbors and newcomers, it defeated all of them, one after another. Territory on earth befell it. Its possessions are in three parts of the world and one seventh of the earth belongs solely to it... And proud Europe, which always despised Rus’, despising and not understanding its spiritual power, saw the terrifying material power, one which it understood. And consumed by hate, and in secret terror, it looks upon this frightening body which is full of life, but whose soul it cannot understand” (qtd in Gorskii 365).

Notwithstanding all the differences and nuances of thought among the individual Slavophiles, they were united in one point: that Christianity is the primary characteristic of the Russian people. They believed that Russian man was *first* a Christian and son of the Orthodox Church and *then* a citizen and son of the Russian state. Ironically, despite their opposition to autocracy, the exalted vision of a Russian people united in Orthodox faith was assimilated into the tsarist ideological formula “Orthodoxy—Autocracy—Nationality” (Riasanovsky *Nicholas I and Official Nationality*).

The Slavophile frame of acceptance proved useful not only to the Romanov dynasty. Its messianic aspects, in particular, attracted the most unlikely rhetors—the Bolsheviks. Although the Bolsheviks denounced religion as “the opium of the masses” and persecuted priests, they appropriated the nationalistic thrust of the Slavophile discourse, while shifting the accent from the peasants to the proletariat.

Stalin famously exploited the patriotic appeal of the Orthodox religious tradition during World War II, when he relaxed the state’s proscription against church going and worship in order to rally the population to fight the Holy War against the “dark fascist power,” to quote a famous song from those years.

While the totalitarian state relied on the residual religious sentiment of the people to mobilize the country in the war effort, dissident writers and artists saw religion as a source of moral courage in the face of ideological oppression. Banned from the public sphere and writing “for the drawer,” they often appealed to the divine authority as the ultimate arbiter of history and their place within it. Anna Akhmatova’s *Requiem* compared the author’s plight to that of Christ at the time of the crucifixion: “The heavens were on fire, and he/Said, ‘Why have You forsaken me, oh Father?’.” In *Doctor Zhivago*, Boris Pasternak calls on the symbolism of the Last Judgment to assert the righteous path of the artist as distinct from the official path toward communism charted by the country’s leaders.

In the late sixties and early seventies, when discussions of religion and its place in Russian identity began to appear in underground publications of Samizdat, the argument between nationalist and ecumenical interpretations of Christianity once again acquired prominence. Gorski’s warning about temptations of the past, quoted at the beginning of this essay, was a response to the wave of neo-Slavophilism that swept over both Samizdat publications and some of the mainstream journals such as *Molodaja Gvardija*. To him, the messianic consciousness displayed by the neo-Slavophile interpretation of Russian national

identity was not much better than the discredited utopianism of Marxism-Leninism: “The inclination to sanctify State rule, the desire to assign absolute categories to natural-historic formations, is testimony to the position of consciousness at the level of religious naturalism and external interpretation of Christianity. The confusion of two kingdoms—the kingdom of the Spirit and the kingdom of Caesar—is a tempting utopia, no less terrifying in its consequences than the communist idea of ‘heaven on earth’ (368). To rid itself of despotism, Gorski argued, Russia needs to “reject the idea of national greatness. For this reason, it is not ‘national renaissance’ but the struggle for Freedom and spiritual values which must become the central creative idea of our future” (386).

Confronting the Soviet Past: Religion and National Identity in Discourses of Perestroika

Religious symbolism played a major role in public discourses of the late 1980s. A number of perestroika-era artists turned to religion to address the trauma of the Soviet past. In fact, Tengiz Abuladze’s film *Repentance*, shown to packed movie theaters around the country in 1987, heralded Gorbachev’s policy of *glasnost*’ (openness) (Horton and Brashinsky). This allegorical story about the trauma of the Stalinist era and the need to remember its sins was a symbolic beginning of a widespread probing of Soviet history and as such deserves a closer look. The film opens with a scene showing a middle-aged woman making elaborate cakes in the shape of churches. The woman is Ketevan (Keti) Barateli, daughter of a painter sent to a gulag by a Stalinist mayor Varlam, depicted in the film as an agglomerate of Mussolini, Hitler, Stalin and Stalin’s Secret Police chief Beria. In the film, Keti is the agent of memory, bringing to light the crimes committed by Varlam decades before. Keti is on trial for disinterring Varlam’s recently buried body, and her testimony drives the film’s narrative. The revelation of Varlam’s crimes sets in motion a tragic chain of events: Varlam’s

impressionable and idealistic grandson Tornike takes his own life and his son Abel, the current mayor of the city, ends up digging up his father's body one last time and throwing it off a cliff. The end of the film circles back to the scene with Keti making cakes when she hears a tap on the window. At the window is an elderly woman who thirty years earlier implored Varlam to preserve a 6th century church in danger of crumbling due to scientific experiments performed there. She asks Keti: "Is this the road that leads to the church?" Keti answers, "This is Varlam Street and it will not take you to the church." "What good is a road that doesn't lead to a church?" the old woman responds and walks into the distance, her back to the camera.

Unlike many journalistic and artistic accounts that addressed Stalinism during perestroika, *Repentance* approaches the trauma of Stalinist repression and the amnesia of the Brezhnev era through a religious parable of victimage and redemption. The circular structure of the narrative highlights Keti's character as an embodiment of spirituality and historical vigilance and portrays Varlam's breach of the divine and human law as a sin that continues to haunt the lives of his descendants. Abel's eventual repudiation of his father comes too late to save his son, who plays the role of a sacrificial vessel.

Although *Repentance* uses religious reference to transcend the particulars of history, its rhetorical impact depends on the audience's tacit understanding of various historical allusions. For example, the elderly lady's complaint about the use of a medieval church for scientific experiments reflects the Soviet regime's widespread destruction of churches in the 20s and 30s. In another allegorical scene, Abel has a dream of confessing to a hidden priest who is eating a large fish. Abel admits that he is a hypocrite: "I preach atheism and I wear a cross." At this point the priest reveals himself to Abel and hands him the bones of the fish. The priest is Varlam. Not only does this scene allude to the overall hypocrisy of the Brezhnev

era when party officials did not even believe the ideology they preached, but it also implicitly condemns the corruption of the Orthodox priesthood under the Soviet regime.

Repentance offered the Soviet audience “equipment for living” in that it provided familiar tropes to deal with the current socio-political situation. The film’s message of repentance and historical awareness resonated with a broad national support for public recognition of Stalin’s crimes. Yet its blend of exhortation and consolation was not adopted as a rhetorical strategy by democratic activists who led the effort to excavate the country’s shameful past. The so-called Memorial society, formed in 1987 with the help of famous artists and intellectuals, including poet Yevgeni Yevtushenko, singer Bulat Okudzhava, and mathematician Andrei Sakharov, made its mission to research and bring to light the names and biographies of all victims of the Stalin regime as well as to build a permanent memorial to honor them. In “The Memorial Manifesto,” Yevtushenko argued against honoring only “celebrity victims”: “The national conscience and the national talent is not a privilege limited to celebrities. Our duty is to honor the memory of the murdered innocent grain harvesters, laborers, engineers, doctors, teachers, people of all professions, all nationalities and faiths, each of whom is a particle of the murdered national conscience, the national talent” (16).

The Memorial’s commitment to pluralism in honoring Stalin’s victims, however, made it difficult to settle on a particular symbol of collective suffering and redemption. It was one thing to publish all the names, but it was an altogether different task to express the magnitude and complexity of the regime’s crimes against its own citizens in a monumental form. This difficulty transpired during the open design competition for a national monument sponsored by the Memorial. The competition yielded many lay proposals. Some emphasized the motifs of World War II, when the Soviet Union was unified by the struggle against Nazi invaders. Others drew on Russian Orthodox iconography to express the idea of collective mourning and common cultural heritage. Several proposals advocated the rebuilding of Moscow’s Cathedral

of Christ the Savior, which was destroyed under Stalin in the early 1930s. The Memorial's leadership, however, "wanted a form of commemoration that would challenge people's complacency." They "saw a monument as merely a complement to civic action—the real guarantee against a return to totalitarianism—and to research—the embodiment of a continuing search for truth" (Smith 198-99).

From this perspective, religious idiom, just like the old Soviet iconography of triumphant socialism, was considered inadequate as a symbol of communal identification. Radical democrats among the members of the Memorial saw religion not as a distinct anchor of a new democratic identity but as one among many other important democratic values, such as freedom of speech and assembly. Furthermore, they reasoned that Christian symbolism would be alienating to ethnic and religious minorities who were persecuted no less than Orthodox Christians and Russians. Finally, the rhetoric of victimhood showcased in many religiously flavored designs implied the lack of agency and only perpetuated the dichotomy of the powerless people versus the all-powerful state.

The Memorial Society has not yet built a monument to Stalin's victims, although in 1990 it marked a place for it in the Lubianka Square, opposite the State Security headquarters. As a result of its reluctance to articulate a coherent narrative of national unity, however, the Memorial lost the opportunity to influence the ongoing discussion of national self-definition. Having won Gorbachev's support in official rehabilitation of political prisoners and removal of barriers to free speech, democratic activists moved on to other issues. In so doing, they effectively ceded the rhetorical field to proponents of nationalism both secular and religious.

Indeed, many who embraced Russian Orthodoxy and supported the rebuilding of churches destroyed under Communism were after a different vision of the country's identity. If the Memorial Society represents one side of the remembrance culture of the late Soviet period, another group named Pamyat' (which means "memory" in Russian) stands for an

opposing tendency. Originating in the activist work of the All-Russian Society for the Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments, Pamyat' became a venue for an eclectic blend of nationalist pride, Stalinist revival, and vocal anti-semitism (see Korey; Kostyuk). Several of its members were well-known artists and intellectuals, such as "village writer" Valentin Rasputin, painter Ilya Glazunov, sculptor Klykov, and mathematician Igor Shafarevich. The more extreme among them, such as Shafarevich, were eager to blame all the ills of the Soviet era on the Jews, who supposedly destroyed the country's spiritual heritage and led to genetic impoverishment of the Russian people. In Pamyat's revision of Soviet history, Stalin was a strong leader whose patriotic vision and policies were undermined by Jews and "cosmopolitan" intellectuals. One of Glazunov's paintings, titled "The Mysterium of the Twentieth Century," is a vivid if kitschy effort to exculpate Stalin by depicting him as the Father of Peoples and an architect of the Soviet victory in World War II (Platonov). In Pamyat' account, the Jews in Stalin's circle, particularly Moscow city planner Lazar Kaganovich and Palace of the Soviets architect Boris Iofan, were the ones responsible for the destruction of religious heritage, most vividly demonstrated by the barbarous detonation of the Church of Christ the Savior in 1931.

Although Pamyat's rhetoric of scapegoating is an extreme example of the appropriation of Russian orthodoxy, nostalgia for pre-revolutionary cultural values and longing for a strong state took center stage in public discussions of history and national identity in the late eighties and beyond. Frustrated by political fractiousness and economic instability, more and more people were beginning to lose confidence in democratic reforms and to consider them an unwelcome Western influence. By then, the Soviet Union had definitely lost the Cold War and the policy of glasnost' had revealed the desperate condition of the country's social infrastructure. Against this backdrop, narratives of Russia' past

national greatness and cultural uniqueness were bound to provide “equipment for living” to all citizens who felt humiliated by the country’s present condition.

Thus a milder form of nationalist rhetoric, in some ways resembling pre-revolutionary discourses of the so-called Slavophiles, ascended to prominence in the public sphere. Perestroika-era nationalists invoked Russia as a long-suffering “motherland” and its people an innocent victim of Communists (in the past) and pro-Western reformers (in the present). Among the victims of the Communist regime were the Russian Orthodox Church, the Russian tsar Nicholas II and his family, the Russian earth, Russian peasants, and the sacred values of the Russian past (Ries 102-103). Present-day woes of the country were blamed on Western capitalists and their “cosmopolitan” supporters at home, although now they were condemned not for their hatred of socialism but for undermining native traditions and imposing alien political and ethical norms.

In keeping with the Slavophile narrative of Russian historical and spiritual mission, nationalists saw Orthodox religion as a natural ally. Yet unlike their nineteenth-century predecessors, perestroika-era nationalists valued Russia’s imperial status and bemoaned the weakening of the state. Even if they derided the Soviet bureaucracy, they nonetheless endorsed its military. Nationalism thus brought together some curious bedfellows, as can be seen in the following report by American journalist David Remnick:

A few weeks ago, at the Red Army Theater in Moscow, priests and army officials took the stage and announced their unity. They spoke not of Lenin and Gorbachev, but rather Alexander Nevsky, Dimitri Donskoi, and other warrior-priests of Russian history and legend. With a row of war-won medals dangling from his cassock, a priest blessed the huge audience of young soldiers, saying “God is our general!” (qtd in Kull 84)

It would be wrong to assume, however, that the emergence of nationalism represents an anti-intellectual strand in the public culture of perestroika. Alexandr Solzhenitsyn, whose moral authority as a survivor of Stalin's camps and a dissident chronicler of "the Gulag archipelago" is beyond reproach, has lent legitimacy to this narrative of Russian cultural uniqueness. Solzhenitsyn's well-publicized pronouncements about the decadent West and its hollow materialistic values, coupled with his nostalgic invocation of a pan-Slavic community united around Orthodox faith, articulated a less authoritarian vision of a new Russian identity than the one promoted by hard-core nationalists. In his article "How to Revitalize Russia," published in the fall of 1990 in major national newspapers, he advocated national sovereignty of all non-Slavic republics lest the "concrete structure" of the collapsing Soviet regime crush all beneath the rubble. Still, even after his return to the motherland, Solzhenitsyn remained a marginal figure in the debates over Russian identity.

In general, as Russian sociologists observed, "the political correlate (in mass consciousness) of the movement away from atheism and toward Orthodoxy [was] a movement from communist totalitarianism toward 'reactionary-romantic' authoritarianism" (Filatov and Furman).

Conclusion

How did it happen, then, that appeals to religion, a ready source of cultural authority, failed to be used effectively by a pro-democracy movement and succeeded, by contrast, in rallying support for nationalistic causes? I suggest that the democrats' rhetorical failure stems from their reluctance to recognize the virtue of symbolic identification and their insistence on non-representational methods for promoting truth and reconciliation (such as creating archives and supporting research). Although the message of the film *Repentance* was very

much in line with the purposes of the Memorial Society, the film's use of religious symbolism seems to have been largely ignored. By placing a non-descript boulder in the Lubianka square, all the Memorial achieved symbolically was to stake out a site of protest against the regime, without offering a more positive symbol of remembrance.

On the other hand, the nationalists' appeal to religion as a common cultural denominator allowed them to combine what Burke calls frames of "rejection" and "acceptance": while they identified Russia and its people as victims of various external forces (and thereby used rejection as a source of motivation), they also presented Russian Orthodox spirituality as a permanent source of positive transcendence. Such tactics also allowed a variety of nationalistic positions, whatever their "enemies" happened to be, to coalesce around the positive pole of communal identification.

In addition, appeals to common political identity in the perestroika era depended for their success on patterns of identification established in the nineteenth century and reinforced by public culture of the Stalin era. In this regard, Gorski's argument about the malevolent influence of "unconscious patriotism," manifested in appeals to national greatness, is particularly germane. To counteract the messianic frame of acceptance and to replace it with a new pattern, based on "an intelligent creative act of spiritual self-definition" (392), would require more than mere public condemnation of Stalinism and introduction of market reforms.

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Irena Buckley

La topique chrétienne dans le discours politique contemporain lituanien

The Christian Topos in Lithuanian Political Discourse

Abstrakt

President Valdas Adamkus stated in 2007 that the Lithuanian state was undergoing an identity crisis. Using research based on a linguistic corpus prepared at Vytautas Magnus University, my article relates that notion to the use of Christian topoi in Lithuanian parliamentary discourse. Our aim will be to see if the Christian heritage of Lithuania is at stake.

Christian rhetoric returned to the public sphere in Lithuania in 1990, but the country's legislators have never tried to introduce such rhetoric into the European constitution. What then is the exact function of this rhetoric in Lithuanian parliamentary speeches? And to what extent does the tradition of popular Christian faith correspond to current social reality in Lithuania?

In the wake of the Soviet period, during which political rhetoric consisted of monologue rather than dialogue, Lithuania is still trying to rebuild the foundations of an intelligent, logic-based discourse in the public sphere. Unfortunately, the models currently in vogue are borrowed from journalism and marketing, which is reflected in their ethos- and pathos-based types of argumentation.

Politicians use social codes to reduce the distance between themselves and their audience, and since modern moral codes remain "essentially religious" (E. Durkheim), they are able to refer to the divine kingdom and moral transcendence, using the three elements of persuasion by ethos: competence, confidence, and community of interests. This may be seen in proverbs, clichés, and sayings, giving their language a colloquial flavour, forgetting the injunction not to use God's name unnecessarily (A. G. Gargani). They also use ethos to strengthen their moral authority, as when taking the parliamentary oath, for an oath involves responsibility and belief, according to J. Derrida. One is left to wonder, however, whether these are the genuine expressions of religious sentiment or mere ornaments destined to further legislators' political aims.

Lithuanian history facilitates the use of Christian topoi by members of parliament, for religion and patriotism have often been linked in resistance against repressive regimes and in the familiar topos "Lithuania, the land of crosses and of the Virgin Mary". Thus, there are several ways in which these themes are employed by legislators, even when they are not

practicing Catholics, like the non-believers who rely on believers for moral support (S. Zizec): in search of a moral standard to apply to themselves and to colleagues, they invoke the Decalogue, denounce hypocrisy, or pose as omniscient orators who must be listened to and obeyed by all.

Humankind's sublime nature is a topos that often turns into ironic discourse when it is used to mock adversaries' grandiloquence and divine pretensions, while the "God and country" topos similarly gives way to a sarcastic comparison between professed ideals and the reality of a society fuelled by self-interest and greed.

Five conclusions can be drawn from our study, even if it is but an introduction to a vast but little-explored field: 1) The Christian topos is frequent in Lithuanian political discourse, but it rarely translates into a sublime form of rhetoric, 2) The mixture of political and religious language is aimed not at a specialized audience, but at the mostly Christian general public, to whom Christian signs and symbols are familiar and welcome, 3) The Christian topos affects its audience's emotions, providing relief from abstruse and boring administrative and conceptual discourse, 4) Ethos, the speaker's identity (political party, aims, intellectual level), plays a key role in the use of this Christian discourse. Facile, popularized religious elements are folded into carefully crafted arguments, spicing up dry political language, nuancing everyday speech, 5) Political discourse plays with the Other's religious sentiments, and this game shows disregard and disrespect for the importance of the Catholic religion in the history and the identity of Lithuania, known as "The Land of the Virgin Mary".

Topika Chrzescijanska w Litewskim Dyskursie Politycznym

Streszczenie

Prezydent Valdas Adamkus stwierdził w 2007 roku że państwo Litewskie przechodzi kryzys tożsamości. Opierając się na danych językoznawczych przygotowanych przez Uniwersytet Vytautasa Magnusa w Kownie, autorka odnosi to zjawisko do topiki Chrzescijanskiej w litewskim dyskursie parlamentarnym. Celem jej badań jest stwierdzenie czy kryzys ten oznacza że Chrzescijanska spuścizna Litwy jest zagrożona.

Chrzescijanska retoryka powróciła do sfery publicznej na Litwie w 1990 roku, ale prawodawcy litewscy nigdy nie próbowali włączyć tej retoryki do konstytucji europejskiej. Jaka wobec tego jest funkcja tej retoryki w litewskich wystąpieniach parlamentarnych? Do jakiego stopnia tradycja Chrzescijanskiej wiary przystaje do współczesnych realiów społecznych na Litwie?

Od czasów sowieckich, kiedy to retoryka polityczna sprowadzała się do monologu zamiast dialogu, Litwa próbuje odbudować fundamenty inteligentnego, opartego na logice dyskursu publicznego. Niestety, modne modele wywodzą się z dziennikarstwa i marketingu, co odzwierciedla się w argumentacji opartej głównie na etosie i patosie.

Politycy używają kodów społecznych w celu zmniejszenia dystansu pomiędzy nimi samymi a ich słuchaczami, a w związku z tym ze współczesne kody moralne pozostają „zasadniczo religijne” (Durkheim), politycy odnoszą się do królestwa niebieskiego i moralnej transcendencji używając trzech elementów perswazji przez etos: kompetencji, zaufania, i wspólnoty interesu. Elementy te są widoczne w przysłowiach, kliszach językowych, i powiedzeniach nadających językowi polityków charakteru kolokwialnego (Gargani). Politycy używają etosu także do wzmocnienia swojego autorytetu moralnego, na przykład w czasie składania przysięgi parlamentarnej, jako że przysięga, jak twierdzi Jacques Derrida, zakłada odpowiedzialności i wiary. Można się więc zastanowić, czy są to autentyczne wyrazy uczuć religijnych czy tylko ozdobniki używane do łatwiejszego osiągnięcia celów politycznych.

Historia Litwy ułatwia użycie topiki Chrześcijańskiej przez parlamentarzystów, jako że religia i patriotyzm często łączyły się w opozycji przeciw despotyzmowi (jak w znanym powiedzeniu „Litwa, ziemia krzyży i Dziewicy Marii”). Istnieje wiele sposobów użycia tej topiki przez polityków, nawet jeżeli nie są oni praktykującymi katolikami, na przykład przez niewierzących a polegających na moralnym wsparciu wierzących (Zizec): w poszukiwaniu moralnych norm którymi mogliby oceniać siebie i innych odwołują się oni do Dekalogu, atakują hypokryzję, albo pozuja na wszechwiedzących mówców którzy mają być słuchani przez wszystkich. Wzniosła natura człowieka to topos który często nabiera charakteru ironicznego kiedy używany jest do szydzenia z krasomowstwa przeciwników, a z kolei topos „Bóg i ojczyzna” przechodzi w sarkazm w zestawieniu z kontrastem pomiędzy wyrażanymi idealami a realiami społeczeństwa napędzanego przez interes własny i chciwość.

Z badań nad dyskursem parlamentarnym można wyciągnąć pięć podstawowych wniosków: 1) topika chrześcijańska występuje często w litewskim dyskursie politycznym, ale rzadko przeradza się we wzniosłą formę retoryki; 2) mieszanka języka polityki i religii przeznaczona jest dla ogólnego, w większości Chrześcijańskiego, odbiorcy; 3) topika Chrześcijańska oddziałuje na uczucia odbiorcy, dostarczając ulgi od niezrozumiałego i nudnego dyskursu administracyjnego; 4) etos, tożsamość mówcy (przynależność polityczna, cele, poziom intelektualny) grają zasadniczą rolę w użyciu topiki Chrześcijańskiej. Płytkie, spopularyzowane elementy religijne wplatane są w starannie przygotowaną argumentację, nadając smak suchemu językowi polityki i niuans mowie potocznej; 5) dyskurs polityczny

bawi sie religijnymi uczuciami innych, a ta zabawa okazuje lekcewazenie i brak szacunku dla znaczenia religii Katolickiej w historii Litwy, znanej jako "ziemia Dziewicy Marii."

Le président de la Lituanie Valdas Adamkus dans son discours pour l'année 2007 a mentionné la crise de l'identité de l'Etat. Puisque la Lituanie est un pays de tradition chrétienne, l'on pourrait supposer qu'au XXI siècle la crise de l'Etat reflète une crise de l'identité chrétienne du pays. Il est donc pertinent d'analyser les signes chrétiens du discours politique lituanien contemporain. Dans cet article nous nous limitons au discours parlementaire. Nous allons examiner les sténogrammes du parlement qui constituent un corpus linguistique préparé par l'Université Vytautas Magnus, ainsi que des pages du site web du parlement lituanien.

Après l'effondrement du régime soviétique, le discours religieux, qui était interdit ou traité défavorablement en Lituanie, s'est relevé, en se greffant sur les discours sociologique, culturel et politique. C'est pourquoi on dit souvent que la Lituanie est un pays très religieux. Les sociologues donnent les chiffres suivants : 85% des Lituaniens sont croyants, un tiers d'entre eux sont pratiquants, et cinq personnes sur six acceptent le christianisme comme tradition ou comme base éthique. Ainsi, dans la rhétorique du discours public on peut trouver beaucoup de symboles chrétiens. Mais quand on examine la situation plus profondément, le doute s'installe : peut-être la force de la croyance religieuse en Lituanie n'est-elle qu'un mythe? Pourquoi les parlementaires lituaniens, qui doivent refléter l'attitude du peuple, n'ont-ils pas remis en question l'absence dans la constitution européenne de toute mention des valeurs chrétiennes? C'est comme s'ils avaient trop hâte de faire adopter cette constitution pour s'arrêter sur de telles questions. Cependant, la topique chrétienne reste fréquente dans le discours parlementaire lituanien. A quoi sert-elle?

La tradition de l'éloquence politique n'est pas bien développée en Lituanie. Elle a été étouffée par la rhétorique soviétique unifiée, fondée non pas sur l'argumentation, la méthode dialogique, mais sur l'ordre et le monologue. Seize ans après l'indépendance on essaye de changer la manière de parler. Mais il est très difficile de créer un langage qui convienne à l'élite politique. C'est la stylistique des journaux quotidiens ou de la télévision qui domine aujourd'hui dans le discours politique lituanien. Donc, le niveau intellectuel reste peu élevé, tandis que l'argumentation logique et le raisonnement conceptuel manquent. Le style publicitaire évoque des arguments émotionnels qui relèvent du type ethos et du type pathos.

La rhétorique parlementaire est souvent fondée sur des codes sociaux bien connus qui expriment les valeurs de la société. La topique chrétienne fait partie de tels codes explicites. Les signes religieux du discours politique sont surtout liés à l'argumentation par l'éthos. La tribune parlementaire a toutes les possibilités de montrer aux citoyens qu'il existe des liens entre les règles éthiques, formulées par la religion et les idéaux d'une nouvelle morale qui reste, d'après Emile Durkheim, « essentiellement de type religieux » (Durkheim, 1964, 168-172). Donc si le gouvernement veut montrer que le pouvoir s'appuie sur les mêmes principes que l'ordre divin et la morale transcendante, cela peut renforcer la confiance, voire l'éthos des hommes politiques.

En employant la rhétorique de l'éthos, le destinataire politique préfère influencer par sa personnalité et par ses critères moraux. La théorie contemporaine énumère trois conditions pour persuader par l'éthos : la compétence, la confiance, et la communauté des intérêts (Herrick, 2001, 84). Comment les parlementaires lituaniens utilisent-ils ces possibilités persuasives ?

Tout d'abord, ils veulent montrer qu'ils parlent la même langue que leur auditoire. Dans ce but, ils emploient des formules religieuses, ainsi que certaines expressions, certains clichés, et des proverbes. Cela diminue l'aspect déclaratif de la parole et rapproche le discours politique du langage quotidien, en donnant de l'individualisme à ce discours impersonnel. Dans ce cas, les parlementaires lituaniens n'évitent pas d'employer le nom de Dieu. Dans les sténogrammes du CL ce mot est employé 139 fois, et dans le plus vaste recueil des sténogrammes, mises dans les pages du site web, 508 fois. Donc, les politiques oublient la formule bien connue « Que tu ne prononces pas le nom de Dieu inutilement », cette formule qui garde, comme le dit Aldo Giorgio Gargani, une valeur provenant des mots, du silence, et du mystère de l'histoire des mots (Derrida, 2000, 132). Au parlement lituanien on jure souvent avec le nom de Dieu sur les lèvres. Les orateurs cherchent le mode linguistique le plus authentique, ou bien ils font cela naturellement quand ils emploient des expressions qui relèvent de la langue parlée. Ils se permettent d'avoir recours aux petits genres folkloriques, tels que des soupirs (Mon Dieu, Cher Dieu), il aiment les formules idiomatiques (que Dieu donne, qu'il bénisse, Dieu merci, que Dieu garde un tel), qu'il nous protège). Un élément chrétien apparaît dans les proverbes qui donnent des couleurs vives de la parole quotidienne (Dieu est au ciel et le roi est loin, Si Dieu le punit, il reprendra la raison). Parfois les orateurs se servent de la phraséologie ordinaire (que votre voix entre dans l'oreille de Dieu). Une telle topique ne montre pas l'élément chrétien comme partie intégrante du fondement culturel, ne

suggère guère qu'il influence la culture de manière significative. La topique religieuse dans ce cas diminue l'ennui et donne une certaine couleur stylistique au discours politique.

Un deuxième élément qui incite les politiques à employer la topique religieuse, c'est le désir de se présenter comme quelqu'un d'honorable et digne de confiance. Le parlementaire peut étaler publiquement ses convictions religieuses ou son laïcisme. Cela devient évident quand les parlementaires choisissent la possibilité d'employer ou de ne pas employer la formule «Que Dieu m'aide» dans le texte du serment parlementaire. La rhétorique du serment est particulière, car ce discours incarne non seulement des mots mais une action aussi. Cette forme de parole est même caractérisée par une certaine sacralisation. L'acte de faire un serment, selon Jacques Derrida, évoque une responsabilité et une croyance, car ici on invite Dieu comme témoin, avec ou sans mention explicite de Son nom (Derrida, 2000, 41). Ainsi, le topos « Que Dieu m'aide » n'est pas qu'une vaine formule servant à terminer un texte. Il exprime des valeurs et implique une certaine responsabilité morale. C'est pourquoi dans les débats parlementaires il est souvent fait état de personnes qui jurent en employant cette formule, mais dont le comportement ne correspond pas aux valeurs morales.

Mais peut-être que l'élément chrétien est seulement un compliment parfois nécessaire pour la forme, pour épicer un discours? Est-ce que nous pouvons trouver un discours parlementaire qui contienne des aspects plus développés de la conscience religieuse, les fondements de l'éthique chrétienne, de véritables bases métaphysiques? On peut distinguer trois façons d'employer la topique chrétienne. Elle peut être présentée telle quelle, ou bien sous forme édulcorée, voire dans certains cas, dénaturée.

Les parlementaires lituaniens n'hésitent pas à montrer directement leurs convictions religieuses. L'expérience historique du pays leur permet de s'appuyer courageusement sur les valeurs chrétiennes. La religion a toujours été importante dans les révoltes, dans les luttes contre le tsarisme, dans la résistance d'après-guerre, dans les déportations, l'exil et les goulags. Il existe une topique particulière dans laquelle le christianisme s'allie au patriotisme: la Lituanie des croix, la Lituanie terre de la Vierge Marie. Le catholicisme populaire donne l'image d'un Dieu triste, fatigué et soucieux, appelé *Rupintojelis*. S'appuyant sur ce paradigme historique, les hommes politiques lituaniens savent sans l'ombre d'un doute que grâce à l'emploi de la topique chrétienne ils gagneront la compréhension et l'estime de leurs compatriotes.

Les éléments chrétiens peuvent enrichir le discours politique en lui donnant une dimension métaphysique et culturelle. Mais ces interprétations des idées chrétiennes sont assez superficielles, même s'il y a différentes conceptions de la signification de Dieu. Ceux qui font

figure d'intellectuels et veulent imiter le discours philosophique déclarent que Dieu est l'essence de l'existence, tandis que pour d'autres il représente le destin ou la terre et ct.. Dans les discours politiques, l'on emploie souvent la topique théocentrique: Dieu le Père dirige le temps et le destin de tous, établit l'ordre sur la terre, fait des miracles, donne des cadeaux et punit. En revanche, la perspective christocentrique est plus rare. Elle prend corps dans le messianisme, car les parlementaires ironisent sur le comportement messianique de leurs collègues, qui se présentent comme les sauveurs du peuple. Cette perspective christocentrique est fortifiée par la topique de la croix, exprimée par les formules ,par les métaphores usées.. Les parlementaires choisissent des formules idiomatiques pour évoquer un engagement (pour certains, c'est une croix sur le dos), des difficultés (nous sommes passés par tous les chemins de croix dans notre gouvernement), des accusations (mettre le ministère, le gouvernement sur la croix), le désespoir (nous avons fait une croix sur notre carrière politique). Quand on se limite à la phraséologie, le discours ne devient pas plus chrétien ni plus métaphysique.

Parfois les idées laïques remplacent des croyances authentiques. Mais ce qui est intéressant, c'est que les éléments chrétiens sont employés le plus souvent par des parlementaires qui se définissent comme des gens d'orientation laïque, pas religieuse. Peut-être cela leur procure-t-il ce réconfort spirituel qu'évoque Slavoj Zizek, quand il dit qu'il n'est pas difficile de ne pas être croyant quand on sait qu'il y a le grand Autre qui croit pour nous (Zizek, 2006). Donc, quand on s'appuie sur les savoirs et le comportement de cette partie de la société qui croit on reste plus proche de son destinataire et on peut critiquer ses adversaires politiques, qui déclarent leur fidélité aux idées chrétiennes. Mais parfois la topique religieuse redite peut devenir inexacte, car certains, qui ne connaissent pas bien le contexte religieux, peuvent utiliser des métaphores usées incorrectement (par exemple, « peut-être que le doigt de Dieu nous protège »). Mais en déclarant ses conceptions religieuses ou laïques le destinataire politique suggère qu'il est sincère, pas hypocrite, c'est-à-dire, honnête.

La politique et la religion sont reliées le plus souvent au domaine de l'éthique. Les politiques lituaniens manipulent la topique religieuse pour déclarer leurs valeurs et leurs normes comportementales. Tout d'abord, ils présentent leur code moral. Dans ce cas, ils s'appuient sur la topique du Décalogue. Aujourd'hui, comme il manque des personnalités intègres qui puissent accepter l'éthique chrétienne sans compromis, les philosophes (Zizek, 2005, 214-216) interprètent et déforment à leur guise des éléments chrétiens à partir de diverses transformations du Décalogue. Dans le discours des parlementaires lituaniens on peut observer trois sortes de relations avec le Décalogue : certains parlementaires prétendent

s'appuyer sur le Décalogue, d'autres proposent les lois divines à la place du codex éthique contemporain, et enfin un troisième groupe qu'il n'a besoin d'aucun codex, ni celui de Dieu, ni celui des hommes, car il s'appuie sur de solides principes individuels. Naturellement, la loi que l'on mentionne le plus souvent est « Nemeluok » (Ne mens pas). La topique du Décalogue permet de souligner sa propre moralité en ironisant sur le comportement de ses adversaires, qui, eux, déclarent leurs conceptions religieuses mais ne les mettent pas en œuvre de façon concrète.

Certaines normes éthiques sont adaptées aux valeurs de la société lituanienne. Le destinataire du discours politique connaît bien son auditoire et emploie la topique religieuse pour exprimer les notions morales les plus courantes. Un de ces topoi est « Dieu est puissant, l'homme est faible ». Ceux qui utilisent cette rhétorique mentionnent l'autorité divine pour construire leur argumentation: Dieu seul peut changer la situation. Quand ils manquent d'arguments ils menacent leurs opposants en évoquant le tribunal divin. Donc, le discours politique crée l'illusion qu'il y a quelqu'un qui sait tout et que l'auditoire doit lui obéir (Parsons, 2001, 176), et la topique religieuse peut étayer cette notion. Les possibilités humaines sont présentées souvent comme étant limitées par la faiblesse humaine, ce qui est très pratique pour justifier ses actions, car cela sous-entend tout naturellement que l'homme fait des erreurs et qu'il mérite le pardon. Mais la situation devient assez contradictoire lorsque les parlementaires, qui parlent des erreurs, ne se montrent pas guère volontaires pour reconnaître leurs propres erreurs, pour demander pardon ou pour se repentir. La confession publique est un phénomène assez rare au parlement lituanien.

Le deuxième topos employé dans le domaine moral souligne la nature sublime de l'homme : en qualité d'envoyé de Dieu sur la terre, l'homme doit être traité comme un être prioritaire. Mais le plus souvent, ce topos, qui peut se nommer « L'homme est l'égal de Dieu » est présenté de façon ironique. On se moque du désir des opposants politiques de se donner de l'importance, on rigole de ceux qui disent qu'il n'y a que le ciel qui soit au-dessus du parlement. Les parlementaires ironisent sur l'institution elle-même quand ils l'appellent « le parlement divin », ils raillent certains collègues qui « se sentent comme des dieux », et à ceux qui se surestiment, ils rappellent que tous les dictateurs « voulaient monter jusqu'à Dieu ». Certains parallèles comme « le Dieu- UE », « le Dieu- ministère » créent un contexte ironique. L'ironie politique montre l'attitude du destinataire et provoque une réaction de la part de l'auditoire.

Les parlementaires lituaniens aiment souligner leurs valeurs patriotiques. Pour cela ils choisissent le topos « Dieu et la Patrie ». Traditionnellement, ce topos est exprimé par un

parallèle : « aux yeux de Dieu et de la Patrie nous sommes égaux ». Mais c'est l'ironie qui apparaît le plus souvent dans de tels parallèles: il faut demander à Dieu de protéger la Lituanie de l'éthique des conservateurs ». La topique populaire « La Lituanie est la terre de la Vierge Marie » subit des transformations aussi quand elle est présentée dans un contexte ironique. Cette topique d'avant-guerre est liée à des valeurs spécifiquement chrétiennes, à une protection particulière de la part de la Vierge. Mais cette formule semble avoir peu à voir avec les faits et les événements de la société lituanienne de nos jours (le pragmatisme, la toxicomanie, la prostitution), ce qui crée des discours ironiques, tels que : « Malgré le fait que nous sommes la terre de la Vierge Marie, c'est l'argent qui nous stimule le plus ».

Ainsi, l'identité nationale, liée aux valeurs chrétiennes, peut être présentée d'une manière directe et déclarative, comme au XIXe siècle, quand le slogan « Dieu et la Patrie » était un lieu commun dans les discours politiques des opposants au régime tsariste. Mais à l'époque postmoderne, de telles déclarations paraissent insuffisantes. La topique chrétienne- patriotique est déformée par cette ironie, ainsi que par l'hyperbole.

Conclusions

1. La topique chrétienne est assez fréquente dans le discours politique lituanien, mais les éléments chrétiens ne donnent pas souvent une forme sublime au discours.
2. Le mélange du discours politique et religieux vise, non pas un auditoire particulier mais un destinataire de masse, car pour les électeurs d'un pays chrétien les signes et les symboles religieux sont bien connus et bien reçus.
3. La topique chrétienne a une influence émotionnelle sur l'auditoire: elle le distrait dans un monde ennuyeux. Dans ce cas le discours rhétorique remplace un langage conceptuel, celui des discussions portant sur des thèmes administratifs ou techniques.
4. Il ne faut pas sous-estimer l'importance de l'identité du destinataire, de l'éthos, car tout dépend de qui emploie l'élément chrétien, quel parti politique il représente, quel est son but et son niveau intellectuel. La topique chrétienne apparaît dans un message argumenté, un discours de réflexion, mais les éléments religieux y sont souvent présentés de manière peu subtile, voire vulgarisée, dans certains cas. Ils épicient un langage politique dépersonnalisé, une langue de bois, en ajoutant une nuance stylistique à la parole quotidienne.
5. Le discours politique joue avec les sentiments religieux de l'Autre, et ne reflète pas l'identité chrétienne de la Lituanie, que l'on appelle « La terre de la Vierge Marie ».

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Jakub Z. LICHANSKI

“Theology of liberation” and its Tradition in Poland – Church, Politics, and Rhetoric in 1981-1989

*Such maltreatment of man that PZPR [the communist party – added by JZL]
has committed is what we have not seen for a long time.
Let God have mercy on those who have compromised communism and marxism.
Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński, 1965*

“Teologia wyzwolenia” i jej polska tradycja – Kościół, polityka i retoryka w latach 1981-1989

Streszczenie

Celem artykułu jest pokazanie relacji pomiędzy Kościołem polskim a państwem w latach głównie 1981-1989 (autor odwołuje się także do wydarzeń wcześniejszych). Opiera się badacz głównie na analizie kazań różnych przedstawicieli kościoła polskiego, a także oficjalnych dokumentów bądź wypowiedzi przedstawicieli hierarchii kościelnej. Autor pragnie pokazać, iż składają się one na swoistą odmianę “teologii wyzwolenia”. Analiza ukazuje pewne cechy ówczesnej polityki i „walkę o demokrację” jaką prowadził Kościół w specyficznym kontekście historycznym (lata 1981-1989); szczególny nacisk położony jest na analizę wystąpień księdza Jerzego Popiełuszki.

Introduction: What is *liberation theology*?

Let me start with some key concepts.

Theology of liberation rests on the relationship between Christian (mainly Catholic) theology and political activism, particularly in areas of social justice and human rights. Given the controversial nature of those issues, their place in the Church’s teachings and the degree to which the Church’s hierarchy should interfere in them, it has always been the subject of debates.⁵¹

Liberation theology is a sometimes controversial school of [theological](#) thought. At its inception, it was predominantly found in the [Roman Catholic Church](#) after the [Second Vatican Council](#) although some suggest that it was first articulated by [Dietrich Bonhoeffer](#) during the

⁵¹ Cf. *Teologia wyzwolenia*, in: www.pl.wikipedia [2007-02-10]; The Polish entry is somewhat different from e.g. the English entry, cf. the following footnote. Also I. Hawanio, in [he uses the term “theology of liberation” in the sense ascribed to it by Leonardo and Clodovius Boff, cf. the following sections].

late 1930s. It is often cited as a form of [Christian socialism](#), and it has enjoyed widespread influence in [Latin America](#) and among the [Jesuits](#), although its influence has diminished within Catholicism in the past decade. [...] In essence, liberation theology explores the relationship between [Christian](#), specifically Roman Catholic, theology and political activism, particularly in areas of [social justice](#), [poverty](#) and [human rights](#)⁵².

In the context of liberation theology it is crucial to remember pastor Dietrich Bonhoeffer, the leading representative of the Protestant Church who was actively engaged in fighting the Nazi ideology. Published in Poland in 1970, a selection of his works aroused much interest because of, at least in part, his anti-totalitarian message [Bonhoeffer 1970]⁵³.

In this paper I will explore the liberation theology not as a theological but an ideological issue and I will stick to this meaning in the sections to follow. What I understand by ideology is, as Sonja K. Foss put it [Foss 2004, 239]:⁵⁴

An ideology is a pattern of beliefs that determines a group's interpretations of some aspect(s) of the world. It is a system of beliefs that reflects a group's "fundamental social, economic, political, or cultural interests". It represents "who we are, what we stand for, what our values are, and what our relationships are with other groups" – particularly groups that oppose what we stand for, threaten our interests, and prevent us from accessing resources important to us.

The fundamental group is believers or, more safely, the people who go to church because they feel free there. However, this group has got their own interests but its distinctive feature is their opposition against those in power. Those in power first of all stand for other values and their relationship with the society is marked by oppression.

Let me also point out such issues as the historical moment and the implications of the legal system prevailing in Poland before 1989 as the factors determining people's attitudes in the Polish Church [including e.g. the relationship between the Church and the State during the martial law or the activity of Rev. Jerzy Popiełuszko] [Raina 2006].

⁵² Cf. *Liberation Theology*, in: www.en.wikipedia [2007-02-10]; also J. Ratzinger, *Liberation Theology*, [2007].

⁵³ Cf. As the PBL [=Polska Bibliografia Literacka] analysis shows, this book was quite popular; cf. A. Anuszkiewicz, *Wypić ziemskie życie aż do dna... Dietrich Bonhoeffer po 50 latach*, „Jednota” 7/95: *In Poland Bonhoeffer was interpreted in a completely different way; many representatives of the intelligentsia saw a "huge anti-totalitarian potential of Christianity" described in "Wybów pism" by Bonhoeffer and "Chrześcijanin w Trzeciej Rzeszy" by A. Morawska* (T. Mazowiecki). Cf. also D. Bonhoeffer, *Psalmy: modlitewnik Biblii. Wprowadzenie*, translated by various translators, Warszawa 2004 Wyd. Ks. Marianów. However, his books were not published at the time of the martial law.

⁵⁴ She refers here, although not only, to Teun van Dijk's concept.

Some basic concepts in brief

According to Leonardo and Clodovius Boff, when referring to the concept of the theology of liberation one should distinguish between the following ideas [Boff 2007]: (1) Social and Political Development, (2) Ecclesial Development, and (3) Theological Development.

As for the first area, the authors point out that:

The populist governments of the 1950s and 1960s -- especially those of Perón in Argentina, Vargas in Brazil, and Cárdenas in Mexico -- inspired nationalistic consciousness and significant industrial development in the shape of import substitution.

The question is: can Poland of the years 1945-1987/1988 be considered to be a country with a populist government, or was it a country of the so-called real socialism? I draw on the analysis of the socialist system by Ludwig von Mises, whose considerations, I believe, justify this analogy. Let me point out that the literal interpretation of the constitution of the People's Republic of Poland could have led to revealing a self-contradiction in how the government treated the Polish people [Mises 1996; Noszczak 2006]. On the other hand, the consistent attitude of the Church, which among others defended the civic freedoms provided for in the law of the [communist] regime, was very uncomfortable for the government [Micewski 1982; *Kościół...*, 2005].

As regards the Ecclesial Development, the authors point out as follows [Boff 2007]:

Starting in the 1960s, a great wind of renewal blew through the churches. They began to take their social mission seriously: lay persons committed themselves to work among the poor, charismatic bishops and priests encouraged the calls for progress and national modernization. Various church organizations promoted understanding of and improvements in the living conditions of the people: movements such as Young Christian Students, Young Christian Workers, Young Christian Agriculturalists, the Movement for Basic Education, groups that set up educational radio programs, and the first base ecclesial communities.

This naturally holds true for Poland, although the organisations of young people and the forms of the Church's activity were different.

The third concept is a rather obvious observation of the fact that [Boff 2007]:

The first theological reflections that were to lead to liberation theology had their origins in a context of dialogue between a church and a society in ferment, between Christian faith and the longings for transformation and liberation arising from the people. The Second Vatican Council produced a theological atmosphere characterized by great freedom and creativity.

This did not go unnoticed in Poland, which is mentioned by e.g. Andrzej Micewski in his biography of Primate Stefan Wyszyński [Micewski 1982, 2.3-81]. Another expression of this process was Karol Wojtyła's work *Osoba i czyn*, which, published in 1969, „made people realise that a man's participation in social life rested on the sense of community” [Wojtyła 1969; Nitecki 2005, 53-66]. Such works made the reader realise not only the scope of his freedom but also the State's or government's duties towards a citizen. They also helped them become aware that an individual was free and that his participation in community life implied not only duties but also rights.

This approach was consolidated by how Dietrich Bonhoeffer's message was interpreted; as Tadeusz Mazowiecki observed, this attitude was one of opposition against *totalitarianism*⁵⁵. And an individual did have the right to express opposition, to defend moral values! Bishop Bronisław Dembowski's attitude was very similar [Dembowski 1987, 161-174; Lichański 2003, 157-176]; apparently his church activity was limited to e.g. religious teaching in St. Martin's Church in Warsaw's Old Town. What he preached did not refer at all to what was going on in Poland, he talked only about the attitude of believers. However, his words, addressed to the people only four months after 13 December 1981 carried a very important meaning:

Let us not forget that the Holy Spirit is still giving new life to this land after 13 December [Dembowski 1987].

These words made people realise at least two things: (1) that God had not abandoned us unless we lost trust in him and (2) that the Church did realize its duty towards those entrusted to its care [Raina 2006].

⁵⁵ Cf. also the quotation in footnote 3.

Several years later, as noted by e.g. Jean-Pierre Cloutier, Pope John Paul II would verbalise those problems [Cloutier 2007]:

During his trip to Latin America in January and February 1985, Pope John Paul II failed to clarify his position on Liberation Theology. On the one hand, he emphasized the "need to make the impossible in order to bridge the gap separating the rich and the poor" but on the other hand he warned against "passing ideologies" that subordinate the Bible to socio-political categories thus threatening the Church's identity and unity. In 1981, in his encyclical letter *Laborem Exercens* (On Work), he had vigorously supported trade unionism, human rights, due process of law, minimum guaranteed standards of living, as a whole, supporting the struggle of the trade union *Solidarność* in his native Poland.

This "gap bridging" is making people realise their duties towards the community and the consequences of being a Christian.

Putting aside the political aspect of the liberation theology and the relationship, in some Latin American countries, between that theology and the Marxist ideology, I want to point out a more general problem. It is an ideological movement designed to e.g. highlight social justice, poverty and human rights problems. This complexity was noticed already in 1984 by Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger [Ratzinger (1984) 2007]:

Liberation theology is a phenomenon with an extraordinary number of layers. There is a whole spectrum from radically marxist positions, on the one hand, to the efforts which are being made within the framework of a correct and ecclesial theology, on the other hand, a theology which stresses the responsibility which Christians necessarily bear for the poor and oppressed, such as we see in the documents of the Latin American Bishops' Conference (CELAM) from Medellin to Puebla.

I will now come back to Poland and will begin with Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński's attitude. The starting motto shows the attitude of the Primate and the whole Church towards the communist government: those in power have even betrayed their own ideology. Let me quote here [Wyszyński 1980, 27]:

There are widespread and powerful movements, close to being revolutionary!, which are at least the starting point for new ideological, philosophical and social interpretations. [...]

Therefore we are witnessing deep crises of all systems and manners of ruling the people by violation and by efforts to subjugate them. Therefore we are on the verge of some great social revolution that is designed to rehabilitate the man!

The words spoken in 1980 remind us on the one hand of the protest, in the years 1930s, against the Nazi occupation, on the other hand the protest against violation of human rights from which e.g. the theology of liberation sprang. However, the attitude of the Primate and the Polish Episcopacy in 1960s is close to that in the following quotation [Micewski 1982, 2. 5 et sqq; Noszczak 2006, 10-51]:

The Primate also mentioned his seven conferences in St. Ann's Church [church of the academic community – added by jzl] on *Pacem in terris*, pointing out that the Polish Church had become the major supporter of human rights [emphasis added by jzl].

Therefore this issue is rather obvious; in a state of unawareness and with absolutely different theological assumptions the Polish Church started to show an inclination to what Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger would call [...] *a theology which stresses the responsibility which Christians necessarily bear for the poor and oppressed* [...]. The following quotation from a letter of the Polish Bishops on 19 January 1982 can serve as a comment on those words [Słowo..., 1982]:

A vocation for freedom is inherent in the nature of any human and in any nation's mature awareness. This is why a vocation entails a right and a duty. It entails a right, so each human and each nation necessarily experiences a limitation of their freedom as a pain and injustice. A limitation of freedom which is due to a man leads to a protest, opposition or even war.

Rev. Jerzy Popiełuszko's attitude [Popiełuszko 1992]

His attitude, climaxed by his death as a martyr, is most notorious although not the only attitude that is so tragic an event in the Church's history in that period of Poland's history. What was it that Rev. Jerzy Popiełuszko focused on and demanded?

An analysis of his sermons offers grounds for at least two conclusions. First, he demanded that human rights be respected, including the rights of a worker which were guaranteed not

only by the teaching of the Church but the legal documents of the People's Republic of Poland. Second, he did not encourage the nation, as some priests in Latin America did, to fight for their rights through military action. Let me give you some examples [selected ideological assumptions formulated by Rev. Jerzy Popiełuszko]:

1. we suffer the way Christ did; an extended comparison – the nation's destiny is parallel with Christ's destiny; we take the escape to Egypt, or Christ's trial, personally:

Jesus, you suffered already when you were a child because you had to leave your homeland so that Herod's myrmidons could not reach you. So you understood the pain experienced by children whose parents had to hide as if they were villains although they were not. The pain of children whose parents remain confined in camps or imprisoned [sermon on 27 June 1982].

We can always entrust our suffering and our cross to Christ because Christ's trial has not ended yet. The trial continues in his brothers [...] and it is only the names and faces [of the actors of the trial – added by JZL] that have changed. The methods are different but Christ's trial has not ended. [...] the participants are all those who seek to build upon lies, deceit and half-truths, who ridicule human dignity, the dignity of the child of God, who take away from their compatriots what represents a value so respected by God himself, who take away and curb freedom [sermon preached on 26 September 1982].

2. evil brings evil (parable updated) – parallel and generalisation

The martial law was referred to by those who imposed it as a necessary, lesser evil. But evil remains evil. Their sowing will bring evil fruit. Evil crops they will gather [sermon preached on 27 June 1982].

3. a citizen is a threat against the people's government – p a r a d o x and antithesis⁵⁶

A government means service [...] and the citizen has become the government's most hated enemy. Why? Because the citizen has been deprived of his rights and discouraged from fulfilling his duties [...] the government cannot be a tyrant and the state cannot be an organised prison [sermon on 29 August 1982].

⁵⁶ Rev. J. Popiełuszko draws on and develops Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński's teaching.

4. we suffer but we are ready to cooperate – antithesis

Despite the painful experience in the recent months, the nation is still willing to work hard for their Homeland. But it is only a nation that is respected by those in power, one that does not feel as if it was in an organised prison, that can embark on this task earnestly [sermon preached on 29 August 1982].

5. Homeland's suffering – e p i t h e t and a n a l o g y

We are standing in front of Christ's altar and see your picture, St. Maximilian, patron of suffering Poland [sermon preached on 31 October 1982].

The examples clearly show that the means the priest uses are very simple. What is important is the contents of his sermons and the system of ideas which he promotes. The basic group of references applies to human rights which are being violated [examples 1, 4]; another one to the feeling of social justice, which has also been betrayed [example 1]. However, what is most important in the above examples is the observation that the government means service and that the Polish government does not obey this principle [example 3]. Examples 2 and 5 are interesting; the first one is a typical generalisation in which the ideological enemy is warned as he is one that acts in bad faith. The last example is a reference to the 19th century picture of the Homeland in bonds, which still haunts Poles' shared memory; the protagonists of the [communist] regime are thus compared with the invaders.

If we agree with Sonja K. Foss or Teun van Dijk that “*An ideology is a pattern of beliefs that determines a group's interpretations of some aspect(s) of the world*”, the examples given above clearly validate that submission. Rev. Jerzy Popiełuszko expresses his followers' “*fundamental social, economic, political, or cultural interests*” in their relationship with the government. And indeed „*It represents “who we are, what we stand for, what our values are, and what our relationships are with other groups*” – and the speaker tries to show that the values he speaks for are not only an expression of the interests of the group he represents but are universal values of primary importance for the whole society.

And these values are what the communist state departed from. Conversely, the Church does fulfil its mission because its teaching is *a theology which stresses the responsibility which*

Christians necessarily hear for the poor and oppressed, again a quotation from Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger.

Conclusion

With some exaggeration we might conclude that the attitude of the Polish Church, or at least part of it, is a peculiar “liberation theology”, one without a rifle but with a handbook of not exactly ethics but logic.

We can also say that in the years 1981-1989 the Polish Church was not engaged in political activity in the strict sense of the word within the meaning we have ascribed to it. However, the activity of the Church, or rather the activity of many of its members, can be seen as a manifestation of what we call “liberation theology” in our research. The focus on human rights and social freedoms combined with Christianity makes the attitude of the Polish Church closer to the central idea of that variant of theology, whether we want it or not:

In essence, liberation theology explores the relationship between [Christian](#), specifically Roman Catholic, theology and political activism, particularly in areas of [social justice](#), [poverty](#) and [human rights](#) [*Liberation theology*, 2007].

This area was also explored by the Polish Church.

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Ogłoszenia / Nuntii

1. VI Konferencja retoryczna: *Retoryka a nauka*

Termin: piątek 26.10.2007

Miejsce: UW, budynek Wydziału Geografii (Pałac Tyszkiewiczów-Potockich, Sala Balowa), Krakowskie Przedmieście 24, I piętro

PROGRAM

11.00 – 11.05 – otwarcie konferencji

11.05 – 11.35 – Julian Daszkowski – *Statystyka a retoryka*

11.35 – 12.05 – Beata Gaj - *Chymiatrica oscula - chemiczne pocałunki, czyli o łacińskiej XVII-wiecznej prozie naukowej na przykładzie Śląska*

12.05 – 12.35 – Anna Bendrat - *Retoryka a konstytuowanie się komunikacji politycznej jako nauki na przykładzie Stanów Zjednoczonych*

12.35 – 13.05 – Leszek Drong - *Retoryczny charakter interpretacji (na przykładzie literaturoznawstwa)*

13.10 – 14.00 PRZERWA NA OBIAD [Pałac Kazimierzowski - klub]

14.00 – 14.30 - Dorota Heck - *Retoryka a stylistyka tekstów naukowych*

14.30 – 15.00 - Maria Załęska – *Konfutacja w artykułach naukowych*

15.00 – 15.30 - Elżbieta Wierzbicka - *Erystyka w tekstach naukowych*

15.30 – 15.45 - PRZERWA NA KAWĘ

15.45 – 16.15 - Marek Skwara – *Małe podręczniki wielkich mistrzów*

16.15 – 16.45 - Elżbieta Wierzbicka – *Szkolne podręczniki do nauczania retoryki*

16.45 – 16.55 – podsumowanie obrad

UWAGA: - dyskusja po każdym referacie

17.00 - ZEBRANIE WALNE PTR (I TERMIN)

17.15 - ZEBRANIE WALNE PTR (II TERMIN)

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